Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty by Winter, Steven L.
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
6-1-1991
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty
Steven L. Winter
Wayne State University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Steven L. Winter, Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty , 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1881, 1928 (1991)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/295
An Upside/Down View of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty
Steven L. Winter*
I. Figure/Ground ........................................... 1881
II. Parks and Pleasure Grounds .............................. 1890
A. Doctrinal Origins ..................................... 1890
B. Political and Cultural Underpinnings .................. 1895
C. The Persistence of the Pleasure Ground ................ 1902
III. Conflict on Cultural Grounds ............................. 1905
A. Two Worlds, Worlds Apart ............................ 1905
B. Language and Landscape ............................. 1913
IV. Root Difficulties ........................................ 1919
V. Living with the Upside/Down ............................. 1925
"What is worthwhile and what is not are to such a large extent deter-
mined by the existing institutions and forms of life that we hardly ever
arrive at a proper evaluation of these institutions themselves."'
I. Figure/Ground
Sometimes, the best way to solve a difficult puzzle is through a ge-
stalt switch.2 So too, some of the more interesting and intractable
problems in legal theory inhere in the difficulty of distinguishing fore-
ground from background. A classic and familiar form of critique ex-
ploits the ambiguity of figure/ground relations in an attempt to
undermine the conventional assumptions upon which some area of the
law depends.3 But, as effective as this tactic may be for critique, it is
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Visiting Professor, Yale Law School. I am
grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Richard Delgado, Owen Fiss, Jeremy Paul, Pierre Schlag,
Lynn Winter, and the participants in the legal theory workshop at SUNY, Buffalo, for comments
and suggestions. This one's for Charles Ezra. [Ed.-The Texas Law Review wishes to congratulate
Steven and Lynn Winter on the birth of their son.]
1. Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in CRricisM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWL-
EDGE 197, 209 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970).
2. Cf T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONS 122-23 (2d ed. 1970) (con-
cluding that anomalies and scientific crises "are terminated, not by deliberation and interpretation,
but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the ges[t]alt switch").
3. The classic article is Robert Hale's Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470, 472-77 (1923), which argues that the background distribution of entitle-
ments within a legal system will affect what is understood as "coercion." For a more familiar, recent
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problematic as a strategy for reform. The catch, of course, is that a ge-
stalt switch is not the kind of cognitive operation that is usually amena-
ble to conscious decision and control.4 Sure, if someone tells you what
you are supposed to see, you may then be able to reconfigure the stimuli
until they take the suggested form. But it will often prove difficult to
maintain that reconfiguration in the face of earlier, settled habits of
mind.5 And what does one do in the absence of guidance? A gestalt
switch just is not the kind of thing one prescribes with confidence.
To complicate matters, virtually all law takes place in the fore-
ground. What I mean is that legal reasoning typically transpires without
the least awareness of the background assumptions that render it intelli-
gible. 6 This is not the product of ignorance, inattentiveness, or false con-
sciousness. It is, rather, an ordinary matter of psychological and
intellectual efficiency.
Consider the vast amount of everyday knowledge (e.g., where a door
leads, what a red light means, how people behave in a supermarket) that
the average human needs in order to function successfully in the physical
and social world. The sheer mass of it would overwhelm one's cognitive
resources if it were necessary consciously to recall this information before
it could be used. This is readily apparent in the case of a beginning
driver whose hesitancy and conspicuous difficulty are the direct conse-
example, see Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1987) (noting that com-
mon-law assumptions act as the unexamined "baseline" against which departures are measured and
determined to be constitutional violations).
One problem with Sunstein's "baseline" metaphor is that it expresses only one of the possible
figure/ground relations between legal conceptions and the background assumptions that render
them intelligible. The "baseline" metaphor will work when there is a linear or scalar relation be-
tween two conceptions or states of affairs. But the relation between background and foreground
may be one of framing or contextualization. Or there may be a complex, systemic relationship
between two or more concerns. If so, the effort to conceptualize every constitutional issue as a
matter of alternative "baselines" is apt to lead to some very strange conclusions. One example is
Sunstein's characterization of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For him, the opin-
ion assumed as a "baseline for analysis . . . a system in which all workers had a living wage."
Sunstein, supra, at 881. It is as if Chief Justice Hughes had suddenly recognized that the required
constitutional baseline was socialism. For a somewhat more plausible account of the background
assumptions about community and state authority that characterize Hughes's opinion, see Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1441, 1523-27
(1990).
4. "It is quite consistent to say both that we are sometimes able to carry out such [gestalt]
processes, and that we are usually unable to say how we do it." Sch6n, Generative Metaphor: A
Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 254, 275 (A. Ortony
ed. 1979).
5. Cf. Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEXAs L. REV. 1195, 1197-
1203 (1989) (showing how one recursively reinscribes one's own assumptions in attempting to under-
stand other modes of thought).
6. Cf S. FIsH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRAC-
TICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 320-21 (1989) ("This simply means ... that
the context is so established, so deeply assumed, that it is invisible to the observer ....").
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quence of the need consciously to mediate all of her actions and deci-
sions. Learning to drive is a process of internalizing and making tacit
both the physical skills needed to operate a vehicle and the basic rules of
the road. Only as this process is mastered will the novice driver be able
to focus her attention on the road and learn to coordinate with the traffic
around her.
So too, the process of legal decision making is dependent on the
embeddedness or sedimentation of innumerable background concep-
tions.7 This build-up of meanings and assumptions permits the decision
maker to employ these previously internalized conceptions, both cultural
and specifically legal, without the need to synthesize them anew. Obvi-
ous examples in constitutional discourse are the concept of the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" and the rebuke that a particular deci-
sion "is just another Lochner." For an initiate, these phrases need no
citation because they immediately activate a wide array of cultural as-
sumptions about democracy and the work of the courts, as well as a set
of highly charged, professional criticisms that encompass the most severe
forms of theoretical and ethical censure.8 In just this way, sedimentation
enables the legal decision maker to operate at relatively higher levels of
abstraction and complexity, "opening the way for innovations that de-
mand a higher level of attention."9
But this cognitive sophistication comes only at a price. To the very
extent that the legal decision maker gains the ability to focus her atten-
tion and imagination on the task at hand, she will be correspondingly
unconscious of the implications of the conceptual tools that she employs
in its resolution. This would not matter if those tools were neutral and
without normative dimension. If the conceptual tools are normatively
loaded, however, they will shape and affect the legal decision maker's
conclusions in ways that will have discernable normative consequences.
In that case, the decision maker's unreflective invocation of even familiar
7. The term "sedimentation" comes from Husserl by way of Merleau-Ponty. The metaphor
connotes the alluvial build-up of categories and conceptions deposited by the flow of our interactions
and experiences in the physical and social world.
This sedimentation is essential insofar as it frees us from the necessity of having to pay
strict attention to every single thing we do, no matter how simple it may be. We thereby
attain the 'mental and practical space' that enables us to build a personal existence and a
human world.
M. LANGER, MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION: A GUIDE AND COMMEN-
TARY 34 (1989). For a more extended discussion of this process, see Winter, supra note 3, at 1485-
94.
8. This, of course, is precisely the strategy used by Sunstein in his Lochner's Legacy article.
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 874.
9. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 57 (1966) (discussing the related process they call
"institutionalization").
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conceptual tools (perhaps I should say especially of familiar conceptual
tools) will have significant, predictable effects on the outcomes of legal
decision making. These effects will be all the more powerful-and,
therefore, all the more determinative-to the extent that the decision
maker is unaware that the conceptual tools she employs have a distinc-
tive normative skew.10
Of course, it is no longer news that legal conceptions like "freedom
of contract" or "judicial restraint" come laden with normative assump-
tions. But these conceptions are themselves only figures in the very near
foreground. Just as a skillfully painted picture has perspective and
depth, the surface conceptions of legal reasoning rest upon more than a
single layer of sediment. Thus, my use of the figure/ground metaphor to
explain the operation of legal concepts should not be taken to imply a
simple two-dimensional relation. Rather, legal concepts are mediated by
background assumptions that range at different levels of depth. Some
legal concepts, like freedom of contract, are themselves mediated by
other specifically legal conceptions, like the common-law protections of
property and contract. 1 Others, like the countermajoritarian difficulty,
are framed by assumptions about democracy and the work of the courts
that might be characterized as political or cultural. But every aspect of
legal reasoning also occurs against the backdrop of a massive cultural
tableau which provides the tacit background assumptions that render the
legal conceptions intelligible.12
When we focus conscious attention on the various institutions and
forms of life that comprise this multi-layered background, however, it
becomes obvious that these institutions have particular histories: they
10. This normative skew is one example of what Pierre Schlag calls "the politics of form."
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 906-24 (1991); see also Schlag,
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi'". The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1670 (1990) (the politics of form "is the political constitution of human
beings as particular kinds of selves, with particular kinds of social relations to each other"). The
power of these sedimentations to affect decision making in unexpected ways (sometimes even in ways
that are antithetical to the intentions of the decision maker) is a common phenomenon that, follow-
ing Merleau-Ponty, I refer to as "adversity." Winter, supra note 3, at 1480-81, 1488-92.
11. See Hale, supra note 3, at 475; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 885.
12. See Clarke & Simpson, Introduction: The Primacy of Moral Practice, in ANrI-THEORY IN
ETHICS AND MORAL CONSERVATISM 15 (S. Clarke & E. Simpson eds. 1989).
[E]ven simple ... injunctions--"Don't Kill," ["]Don't steal," "Don't break promises"-
have to be imbedded in a network of cultural assumptions if they are not to be purely
abstract requirements that do not yet prohibit anything. Their determinate interpretation
is provided by the rules of background institutions and ways of life that cannot be formally
and precisely spelled out. This conventional background cannot be definitely fixed, but it
is essential for the practical understanding of [these] imperatives.
Id. On the indeterminacy of even the simplest propositions, see Putnam's Theorem. H. PUTNAM,
REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 32-38, 217-18 (1981); G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGER-
ous THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 229-59 (1987).
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are products of prior political encounters and arrangements. As off-
spring of political struggle, these institutions carry with them normative
orientations in the sense that only some possibilities will follow from a
given history; other developments will be impeded by the very fact that
we cognize the world in terms of the particular set of concepts and cate-
gories that arise from these forms of life. The capacity of these concepts
and categories simultaneously to confer intelligibility and shape out-
comes is what I call "the mutual entailment of the epistemic and the
political."13
Thus, to say that law takes place in the foreground is to recognize
that, when the law grapples with the overt conflicts of social life, it does
so only against a sedimented background that already bears normative
orientations. If this insight has remained underdeveloped in mainstream
legal scholarship, it has not escaped the notice of minority scholars. 14
And for good reason: In later sections, I explore the way in which con-
stitutional decision making reflects and transposes these normative orien-
tations into legal outcomes with distinctively majoritarian overtones. At
this point, however, it may help to observe the process in a seemingly
more rudimentary context.
Consider (for the umpteenth time) a simple rule prohibiting vehicles
in the park. "Plainly this [rule] forbids an automobile, but what about
bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are
these, as we say, to be called 'vehicles' for the purpose of the rule or
13. Winter, supra note 3, at 1451-53, 1473-75; see Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2230 (1989) (questioning "the
perspective that narrative is only instrumental and, therefore, at base a purely political tool" and
suggesting, alternatively, that "the power and meaning of narrative is simultaneously epistemic and
political"); id. at 2255-71 (arguing that for law to be perceived as "legitimate" and "objective," it
must be coherent with the pre-existing stock of cultural categories and concepts, but that these
categories and concepts "are cultural artifacts encoding particular and contingent normative
conceptions").
14. See, e.g., Culp, Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the
Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 534, 558 (1991) ("Black law professors are not permitted by our
students or our colleagues to take our backgrounds for granted."). One powerful strategy for re-
vealing and transforming the sedimented background that has emerged from the minority scholar-
ship is the practice of storytelling. See Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1855, 1859 (1990) (noting that storytelling by minority scholars "teach[es] us how racism
and sexism may be hidden but are nonetheless built into the law of the dominant world and dehu-
manize it"); Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411, 2413 (1989) ("Stories... are powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of
presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings, against a background of which legal
and political discourse takes place."); see also D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 4-6 (1987) (noting the pervasive, subconscious character of racism in
our culture). But, as Delgado and Stefancie argue in this issue, this strategy may have significant
limitations. See Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Er-
ror?, 69 TExAs L. REV. 1929 (1991).
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not?"15 It seems natural to focus attention on the foreground question of
what are "vehicles" covered by the rule because this is the locus of the
rule's indeterminacy.1 6 Thus, even Professor Lon Fuller questioned
Hart's analysis by positing a case of a "vehicle" that, if included in the
rule, would yield a bizarre, counter-intuitive result. Suppose, Fuller sug-
gested, that a veterans' group wanted to mount a working World War II
truck on a pedestal in the park as a war memorial. 17 Would it run afoul
of "the 'no vehicle' rule?"18
Of course, Fuller maintained that a rule cannot be reduced to a sin-
gle word; to interpret a rule, he asserted, one must go beyond the formal
text and read the rule in light of its purpose. 19 Yet, he had surprisingly
little to say about how one derives the purpose of the rule against
vehicles:
If the rule excluding vehicles from parks seems easy to apply in
some cases, I submit this is because we can see clearly enough what
the rule "is aiming at in general".... If in some cases we seem to
be able to apply the rule without asking what its purpose is, this is
not because we can treat a directive arrangement as if it had no
purpose. It is rather because, for example, whether the rule be in-
tended to preserve the quiet in the park, or to save carefree strollers
from injury, we know, "without thinking," that a noisy automobile
must be excluded. 20
But, we might ask, how is it that we can "apply the rule without asking
15. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 607-08
(1958); see H.L.A. HART, THE CoNcEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 708-13 (1985) (using the "vehicles in the park" prohibition to demonstrate
that the separation of law from politics cannot be maintained once we recognize the post-Wittgen-
steinian view of language); D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretations of Stat-
utes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561, 595-602 (1989) (describing the "vehicles" prohibition as a "classic
jurisprudential example" and lamenting the tendency of commentators to get carried away with
"penumbras" rather than focusing on the "core" issue); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 524-
26, 540-41 (1988) (discussing the hypothetical rule prohibiting vehicles in the park as it relates to
cars and trucks-the "core" of the rule-and the distinction between enforcing the letter and pur-
pose of the rule); Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1172-80 (1989) (arguing that, although there is indeterminacy at
the periphery, concepts like "vehicle" do have a "core meaning" that is not fixed and determinate,
but rather is an "idealized conception of an experienced, contextual gestalt"); see also M. KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12 (1987) (using "vehicle" to illustrate the linguistic inde-
terminacy thesis).
17. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630,
662-63 (1958).
18. Id. at 663.
19. Id. at 662-63 ("The most obvious defect of [Hart's] theory lies in its assumption that
problems of interpretation typically turn on the meaning of individual words.... Even in the case of
statutes, we commonly have to assign meaning, not to a single word, but to a sentence, a paragraph,
or a whole page or more of text.").
20. Id. at 663.
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what its purpose is" and do so, as Fuller says, "without thinking?"2 1 The
answer is that it is the background conception of a "park" that does most
of the work; it is the idea of a "park" that informs our apprehension of
the rule and renders it intelligible. If we know "without thinking" that
an automobile is to be excluded, it is because we "know" that a park is
for contemplative, meditative, and recreational activities like strolling,
picnicking, exercising, and playing. And, knowing that, we also know
"without thinking" that the purpose of the rule is to preserve the quiet
and safety of the park.22 Indeed, these conceptions are so deeply sedi-
mented that it is hard to conceive of any other reasons for prohibiting
vehicles.
In a later treatment, Fuller recognized that the rule can only be un-
derstood in light of culturally contingent, normative assumptions about
the uses of a park.
[T]he proper interpretation of the ordinance will depend on the
meaning attributed to the institution "park" by the practices and
attitudes of the society in question. In some countries... a park
tends to be a place of quiet and repose, where the citizen may es-
cape the tumult of the city. In the warmer latitudes it may be a
place of music and gaiety, to which the citizen will betake himself
after his need for repose has been satisfied by a siesta .... This
means that in applying the statute the judge or police sergeant
must be guided not simply by its words but by some conception of
what is fit and proper to come into a park; conceptions of this sort
are implicit in the practices and attitudes of the society of which he
is a member. 23
It would be odd, for example, if an official in our culture applied the rule
to a child riding her tricycle in the park. The peculiarity of such an
action does not result from any doubts about the proper classification of
the tricycle: it is plainly a "vehicle." Yet, because it is the kind of vehi-
21. The question is all the more striking because it would be odd indeed for a lawyer or decision
maker to research the question of legislative intent behind the rule. Would she read the minutes of
the meeting at which the park department or city council adopted the rule? Would she search for
some study or commission report that examined the problem of vehicles in the park? Would she find
anything?
22. In this particular case, the highly conventional information conveyed by the sedimented
conceptions "park" and "vehicle" cohere in a way that provides the rule with a relatively un-
problematic degree of determinacy. See Winter, supra note 16, at 1178-79.
The "purpose" of the statute will therefore be evident from its language terms.... It will
be evident because "vehicle" is not just a word, but part of a cognitive process that evokes
an experiential, embodied model. As a structure of thought, that model will identify an
experiential gestalt: an object, its purposes, the manner of its use, and its concomitant
hazards. The same will be true of the word "park": not any area of grass and trees, but
one put aside for certain kinds of uses by embodied humans.
Id.
23. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 58-59 (1968).
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cle that "emits no fumes, makes no noise, and endangers no lives,"'24 it
does not seem to fall within the prohibition against vehicles in parks.
Indeed, unless the rule specified "no bicycles" (as some park signs do),
we would be more likely to assume that tricycle-riding was precisely the
kind of activity that the "no vehicle" rule was designed to safeguard.25
By the same token, part of the force of Fuller's counterexample of
the vehicle-cum-statue in the park derives from the fact that statuary are
a common part of our contemporary experience of parks. But these cul-
tural understandings about the propriety of bicycles and statuary in
parks are historical developments that were themselves the products of
explicitly political theories and subsequent social contention. Many pop-
ular activities, including bicycling, were initially excluded from
America's urban parks because they were considered inconsistent with
the fundamental character and purpose of the park. In fact, it was not
until the late nineteenth century that bicycles were permitted in most
urban parks; even then, they were accomodated with specially con-
structed paths.26 Similarly, park advocates resisted statuary both as un-
democratic (which is to say, European and aristocratic) and as detracting
from the naturalistic effect that was, in their view, the sine qua non of a
park.27 Changes in social practices and park philosophy that took hold
in the first half of this century are, as I discuss below, what shape our
current, unreflective assumptions about the appropriate uses of a park.
Thus, as Fuller observed, the pattern of legal enforcement and extra-
legal changes in the cultural practices that give meaning to the park as an
institution will alter the coverage of even a simple statute like the one
prohibiting vehicles in the park. "All this adds up to the conclusion that
an important part of the statute in question is not made by the legislator,
but grows and develops as an implication of complex practices and atti-
24. Schauer, supra note 16, at 540.
25. Exactly the same issue would arise if the rule banned "motor vehicles" and the child were
riding in the park in her electrically powered toy automobile.
26. See G. CRANZ, THE POLITICS OF PARK DESIGN: A HISTORY OF URBAN PARKS IN
AMERICA 13, 19 (1982). The history of urban parks in the United States is further discussed infra
Part II(B).
27. See id. at 55-56; D. SCHUYLER, THE NEW URBAN LANDSCAPE: THE REDEFINITION OF
CITY FORM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-5 (1986). Cranz quotes a turn of the century
tirade by a park advocate that provides some of the flavor of this opposition:
There should be no place in them . .. for granite pantalooned remembrances of dead
musicians and soldiers and statesmen. If we cannot teach people to realize that they
should keep their effigies of statesmen where they belong, then let us hide them in thick-
ets.... We should put nothing in our parks which suggests unrest or anything disagreea-
ble, or that will frighten children, but we should put in objects that will suggest woods,
trees, water, and nature.
G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 56 (quoting Hall, Park Inconsistencies (pt. 4), 7 AM. PARK & OUTDOOR
ART ASS'N 19 (July 1903)).
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tudes which may themselves be in a state of development. ' 28
These preliminary observations have profound implications for our
conventional understanding of the countermajoritarian difficulty. I ex-
plore these implications in the sections that follow, using selected first-
amendment contexts as case studies. I begin in Part II with an analysis
of the way sedimented social assumptions about parks and other public
spaces have affected the development and application of free speech doc-
trine. Perhaps a better way to highlight the power of our conventional
assumptions, however, is to consider the way in which law is applied in a
cross-cultural context. Accordingly, in Part III, I examine a recent deci-
sion rejecting the free exercise claim of Native Americans to see how
different that claim looks when placed against the backdrop of diverse
cultural assumptions. In Part IV, I explore the standard conception of
the countermajoritarian difficulty and its dependence on the unspoken
and unexamined background assumptions that frame it. Finally, in Part
V, I raise some of the larger ramifications of the observation that the law
can act only against a sedimented background which already bears nor-
mative orientations.
As we illuminate the background, our foreground conceptions of ju-
dicial review will begin to change. The conventional view of the
countermajoritarian difficulty assumes both that the First Amendment
and the other provisions of the Bill of Rights operate as constitutional
constraints on political majorities and that judicial review is the primary
mechanism by which those constraints are enforced.29 In this view, the
countermajoritarian difficulty is a product of the separation of powers
and the establishment of an independent judiciary. But each of these
assumptions becomes problematic once we recognize that judicial inde-
pendence is a matter only of formal institutional design. In a crucialy
important sense, however, judges are entirely dependent on the cultural
understandings that make meaning possible. They cannot apply consti-
tutional provisions such as the First Amendment without making unre-
flective use of a host of deeply sedimented concepts, categories, and
assumptions. Repeatedly, the unarticulated normative orientations im-
manent in these background conceptions shape and produce deeply
28. L. FULLER, supra note 23, at 59.
29. I refer to this as "the conventional view" because, as an historical matter, it was not always
the dominant understanding. For an alternative account of the original conception of the Bill of
Rights that reads its provisions as populist and localist structural protections, see Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). For an account of early nineteenth-century
conceptions of judicial review as a majoritarian constraint on elected representatives, see Nelson,
Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-
1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166, 1170-72 (1972).
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majoritarian legal outcomes-"and that flips the point of the provisions
exactly upside down."'30 In the end, we will confront a dramatically dif-
ferent conception of the countermajoritarian difficulty: the incongruity
of a system that seriously expects the courts to act in countermajoritarian
ways in order to to protect minority interests.31
II. Parks and Pleasure Grounds
A. Doctrinal Origins
The modem public forum doctrine treats public spaces like streets
and parks as presumptively available for expression subject only to rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions.3 2 The doctrine traces its
origin to the Supreme Court's 1939 decision in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization,33 where (writing for a plurality) Justice Roberts
proclaimed:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been held for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.
The privilege ... to use the streets and parks for communication of
views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all;
it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordina-
tion to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance
with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regula-
tion, be abridged or denied. 34
This passage, however, is widely recognized as dicta.35 The actual hold-
ing in Hague is based on a straightforward application of Lovell v. Grif-
30. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 62 (1980).
3 1. Dahli, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6
J. PUB. L. 279, 284 (1957) ("Under any reasonable assumptions about the nature of the political
process, it would appear to be somewhat naive to assume that the Supreme Court either would or
could play the role of Galahad."); Cf R. COVER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 730 (1988) ("I
favor federal courts taking a lead in reforming institutions when the other officials fail.... At times
the federal courts have been our allies in those commitments. There is every reason to believe that
such a convergence of interests was temporary and accidental .... (previously unpublished note of
Professor Cover's found posthumously)).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983) (applying the public forum
doctrine to the public sidewalks surrounding the United States Supreme Court building).
33. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
34. Id. at 515-16.
35. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1197 & n.2 (11th ed. 1985) (noting that the
ultimate holding in Hague rested on narrower grounds); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 233, 238 (noting that, in writing the passage, Justice Roberts answered
the Davis dictum "with dictum of his own").
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fin,36 which the Court had decided the previous term. In each case, the
Court struck down an ordinance that gave local authorities complete dis-
cretionary power to grant or deny permits for first-amendment
activities.37
Justice Roberts's expansive rendition of the "immemorial" tradition
of public expression in the streets and parks is problematic in another
sense. As David Kairys has pointed out, the Hague Court's history was
substantially revisionist; local control over expression was widely prac-
ticed and legally tolerated throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.38 In Davis v. Massachusetts,39 decided in 1897, the Court un-
conditionally affirmed a state conviction for preaching on Boston Com-
mon in violation of a city ordinance.40 The Davis Court quoted from
Justice Holmes's opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
sustaining the ordinance as within the government's power to regulate its
property.41 Justice Roberts offered his revisionist history in direct and
explicit response to the reliance placed on Davis by Jersey City's Mayor
Hague.42 In one sense, then, we can see the Court's exaggeration as pro-
portionate to the adverse history it had to overcome. Read this way,
Kairys's claim that "[t]he Court made an essentially political and social
judgment to change the law" 43 has power and resonance. Roberts did
not distinguish Davis so much as obliterate it.
Under any reading, the decisions in Davis and Hague remain incon-
sistent.44 It would nevertheless be a mistake to see the doctrinal shift
36. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
37. In Lovell, the Court held invalid on its face a local ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
literature on the street without the prior approval of a city official. Id. at 451-52. In Hague, the
Court invalidated an ordinance regulating assemblies and parades "in or upon the public streets,
highways, public parks or public buildings of Jersey City" without a permit. Hague, 307 U.S. at 502
n.1 (quoting the local ordinance).
38. See Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 237,
240-56 (D. Kairys 2d ed. 1990).
39. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
40. Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 46-47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113
(1895)).
42. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514-15 (1939) (plurality opinion).
43. Kairys, supra note 38, at 241. Kairys, however, is sophisticated in his assessment of the role
of social, cultural, and political forces in shaping that "judgment."
The various factors discussed here would not necessarily operate intentionally or even con-
sciously, nor would the justices necessarily see themselves as engaged in anything other
than a legal analysis. Rather, they would be quite accustomed to expressing social and
political concerns and values as legal arguments and to implementing changes of society's
rules expressed in legal terms and not necessarily even self-understood as changes. Their
socialization, education, and experience, their perception of their role, and their under-
standing of the needs of the society they serve could lead to this change in the law.
Id. at 258-59.
44. Kairys points out that Davis also involved a licensing ordinance. "[Tihe Davis Court
clearly based its decision on the property rights of the city, a basis the Hague Court rejected.... The
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from Davis to Hague as a matter of self-conscious revisionism or simple
manipulation. Rather, Roberts's opinion in Hague carefully interrogated
the conceptual underpinnings of each of the Davis opinions. To under-
stand how and why Roberts rejected the earlier Court's reasoning in Da-
vis, we need both to examine carefully the opinions in Davis and to
understand the intervening transformation of the cultural conception of a
park.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Reverend Davis
argued:
Boston Common is the property of the inhabitants of the city of
Boston, and dedicated to the use of the people of that city and the
public in many ways, and the preaching of the gospel there has
been, from time immemorial to a recent period, one of these ways.
For in the making of this ordinance in 1862 and its enforcement
against preaching since 1885, no reason whatever has been or can
be shown.45
The Court responded by quoting at length from the portion of Holmes's
opinion that focused on the absolute nature of the property rights of the
state.
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of
the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right inter-
feres the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon
the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses.
So it may take the less [sic] step of limiting the public use to certain
purposes.46
Ownership is control. Q.E.D.
It is precisely at this point-where most contemporary casebooks
and commentators stop 47-that Roberts began his analysis in Hague.
First, Roberts questioned the Court's rationale in affirming Davis: "The
decision seems to be grounded on the holding of the state court that the
decisions are inconsistent." Id. at 266-67 n.9; see also Hague, 307 U.S. at 533 (Butler, J., dissenting)
(noting that "in principle [the Jersey City ordinance] does not differ from the Boston ordinance, as
applied and upheld by the Court... in Davis").
45. Davis, 167 U.S. at 46.
46. Id. at 47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895)).
47. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 1197 (quoting Holmes's language relied on by the
Court in the Davis opinion); G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1177-78 (1986) (stating that, under the Holmesian approach adopted by the Court in
Davis, the problem of the public forum had been solved by resort to common-law concepts of private
property). Kairys does report that "Holmes, like almost all state and lower federal court judges,
viewed such an ordinance as simply a city regulation of the use of its park." Kairys, supra note 38,
at 239 (footnote omitted). He does not, however, explain why all these judges might have under-
stood the ordinance in that way.
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Common 'was absolutely under the control of the legislature.' ",48 For
Roberts, however, the question of ultimate title was very much beside the
point. Instead, he echoed Reverend Davis's assertion of a "time imme-
morial" use to recognize "a kind of First-Amendment easement."4 9
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest," Roberts observed,
"they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public."50
Taken as a legal rather than historical claim, this statement is far from
revisionist. To the contrary, Roberts's understanding of state law was
historically more accurate than that of the Davis Court. Under nine-
teenth-century doctrine, parks were explicitly characterized as property
held in trust for the public.51
To be sure, Roberts went further and made the historically inaccu-
rate claim that parks had always been held in trust "for purposes of as-
sembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."'5 2 Even so, his rejection of Davis did not hinge on that asser-
tion. Rather, Roberts turned to a ground invoked by Holmes but ig-
nored by the Davis Court on review.
Holmes had made two arguments in his opinion for the Massachu-
setts court in Davis. The property argument relied on by the Supreme
Court and quoted by so many of the commentators was, in fact, the sec-
ond argument. The first was categorical: Holmes rejected Reverend Da-
vis's claim that the ordinance implicated constitutional concerns. "It
assumes that the ordinance is directed against free speech generally, ...
whereas in fact it is directed toward the modes in which Boston Common
may be used."'5 3 For Holmes, the city ordinance was merely a permissi-
ble instance of the government's ordinary power to regulate parks.
"There is no evidence before us to show that the power of the Legislature
over the Common is less than its power over any other park dedicated to
the use of the public."' 54 Only then did Holmes invoke the property
rights of the state and argue that the greater power includes the lesser.
Because the government could "putol an end to the dedication to public
48. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Davis, 167 U.S. at
46).
49. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 13.
This characterization reflects particularly well Davis's claim that the Boston ordinance was not
enforced against preaching for the first 23 years after its adoption. See supra text accompanying note
45.
50. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion).
51. See Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243 (1871) ("[The city took the
title to the lands ... for the public use as a park, and held it in trust for that purpose."), cited in
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895).
52. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion).
53. Davis, 162 Mass. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113.
54. Id.
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uses," it could "take the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain
purposes."'55
Roberts resurrected Holmes's characterization and made it the basis
of his distinction in Hague. Roberts summarized the Court's reasoning
in Davis and observed:
The ordinance there in question apparently had a different
purpose from that of the one here challenged, for it was not di-
rected solely at the exercise of the right of speech and assembly,
but was addressed as well to other activities, not in the nature of
civil rights, which doubtless may be regulated or prohibited as re-
spects their enjoyment in parks.56
Thus, Roberts distinguished the Jersey City ordinance because it dealt
"only with the exercise of the right of assembly" and was not premised
on a general authority "to promote the public convenience in the use of
the streets or parks." 57 To the contrary, the Jersey City ordinance did
"not make comfort or convenience in the use of the streets or parks the
standard of official action."58s By focusing on the Jersey City ordinance's
"uncontrolled official suppression" of speech, 59 Roberts related his dis-
tinction of the decision in Davis to his reliance on the Court's then-recent
decision in Lovell v. Griffin.
From our contemporary perspective, the categorical analysis
adopted by Holmes and Roberts seems bizarre if not disingenuous. After
all, the Boston ordinance did include a clause that specifically prohibited
speaking in the park.6° That it also regulated other activities seems en-
tirely irrelevant. To us, then, it seems appropriate that the Davis Court
should have given the first part of Holmes's reasoning a cold shoulder
and relied instead on a straightforward property analysis. By the same
token, Roberts's embrace of Holmes's peculiar characterization of the
Boston ordinance seems like an unprincipled attempt to avoid an adverse
precedent. 61
55. Id.
56. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 516.
59. Id.
60. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895) (quoted in full at
text accompanying note 64 infra). In contemporary discussions, Davis is consistently characterized
as a case in which "the court upheld Davis's conviction based on a city ordinance that prohibited
.any public address' on public grounds without a permit." Kairys, supra note 38, at 239; see also G.
STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 47, at 1177 ("Davis ... was con-
victed under a city ordinance which forbade, among other things, 'any public address' on any pub-
licly owned property .... ").
61. This impression is reinforced by Roberts's admission that: "We have no occasion to deter-
mine whether, on the facts disclosed, the Davis case was rightly decided." Hague, 307 U.S. at 515
(plurality opinion).
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To evaluate the Holmes-Roberts explanation of the Boston ordi-
nance from our contemporary perspective, however, is to understand
nineteenth-century institutions through the lens of twentieth-century
conceptions. To appreciate how Holmes and Roberts (both of whom
were born and raised in the nineteenth century62) could have portrayed
the Boston ordinance the way they did, it is first necessary to understand
the nineteenth-century conception of a "park."
B. Political and Cultural Underpinnings
The best place to begin the effort to understand the nineteenth-cen-
tury conception of .a "park" is with the text of the Boston ordinance
itself. In contrast to the Jersey City ordinance, which was directed solely
at public speech and assembly,63 the Boston ordinance was directed at a
highly unusual assortment of activities in that city's parks. The Boston
ordinance provided:
No person shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any
public address, discharge any cannon or firearm, expose for sale
any goods, wares, or merchandise, erect or maintain any booth,
stand, tent, or apparatus for purposes of public amusement or
show, except in accordance with a permit from the mayor.64
To contemporary ears, this m6lange sounds less like a lucid regulation of
the park than like one of those children's games in which one lists
"twenty-seven things not to do in the park on a Sunday afternoon" or,
perhaps, a fictive list by Jorge Luis Borges.65 To those who drafted the
Boston ordinance in 1862, however, it was quite natural to include these
disparate activities together in a single provision governing the park. For
it is precisely these activities that were incompatible with the goals of the
then-nascent urban park movement in America.
In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, notables like Wil-
liam Cullen Bryan, Andrew Jackson Downing, Frederick Law Olmsted,
and Horace Greeley championed the construction of large urban parks
that would provide healthful, restorative recreation in the midst of
spreading urban congestion and squalor.66 For these advocates, the park
62. Holmes was born in 1841, Roberts in 1875. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 35, at app. B-5,
B-6. At the time of Holmes's 1895 decision in Davis, Roberts was 20.
63. "[No public parades or public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public
parks or public buildings of Jersey City shall take place or be conducted until a permit shall be
obtained ...." Hague, 307 U.S. at 502 n.1 (quoting the local ordinance).
64. Davis, 162 Mass. at 510, 39 N.E. at 113. Although the ordinance does not use the term
"park," the term "public pleasure ground" was the conventional nineteenth-century equivalent. See,
e.g., G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 15 (quoting Charles S. Sargent's description of the purpose of
"public pleasure grounds").
65. See, e.g., J. BORGES, OTHER INQUISITIONS 108 (1965).
66. See M. KALFUS, FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED 278-81 (1990); see also D. SCHUYLER, supra
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was to be "an oasis from the noisome conditions of the city streets" that
"offered a quiet and tranquillity contrasting sharply with the noise and
activity of the streets." 67
But to its proponents, the new urban park was more than a recrea-
tional facility or modest improvement in urban conditions. Nineteenth-
century park advocates "considered the park not only a naturalistic land-
scape but an experiment in republican institutions. ' 68 The park was en-
visioned as a democratizing and civilizing reform.69 It was to serve the
goal of political reform in two related ways. First, the park was to pro-
vide the opportunity for all classes to associate with one another. In the
words of one proponent, the park was "a kind of democracy, where the
poor, the rich, the mechanic, the merchant and the man of letters, mingle
on a footing of perfect equality."'70  Second, the pastoral scenery of the
park was expected to have a restorative and refining effect that would
"soften and humanize the rude, educate and enlighten the ignorant, and
give continual enjoyment to the educated. '71
In contrast to the cutthroat commercial activity of city life, "the
restorative purposes of the park were [to be] accomplished through a
noncompetitive, nonthreatening 'coming together' and through the rest-
ful contemplation of natural scenery."'72 Thus, Olmsted insisted
that rural scenery could impose a calming sense of its own sacred-
ness on the "rough element of the city." ... Moreover, the natural
note 27, at 62-66 (noting that as access to the country became more difficult, parks were promoted as
enclaves of rural beauty within the city).
67. I. FISHER, FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED AND THE CITY PLANNING MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 102 (1986).
68. D. SCHUYLER, supra note 27, at 181.
69. I. FISHER, supra note 67, at 5 ("IThe creation of parks and city planning emerged as part
of the reform movement of the latter nineteenth century."); M. KALFUS, supra note 66, at 279-80
("Parks had been expected to be the living symbols of gentry culture, democratizing and civiliz-
ing."); see also Blodgett, Frederick Law Olmsted: Landscape Architecture as Conservative Reform, 62
J. AM. HIsT. 869, 877 (1976).
[Olmsted's] parks may be understood to reflect as accurately as civil service reform or tariff
reform or Mugwump journalism a common group desire to counter the headlong popular
impulses of the Gilded Age. The urban park, like the well-designed campus or suburb, was
in his mind an urgent antidote for the restless habits of the American majority .... Olm-
sted's parks seemed to offer an attractive remedy for the dangerous problem of discontent
among the urban masses. In contrast with other reforms put forward by the gentry, they
visibly affected the everyday habits of large numbers of people. By providing pleasant and
uplifting outlets in the narrow lives of city-dwellers, they promised a measure of social
tranquility.
Blodgett, supra, at 877.
70. D. SCHUYLER, supra note 27, at 65 (quoting Stephen Duncan Walker).
71. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Andrew Jackson Downing).
72. M. KALFUS, supra note 66, at 281; see also I. FISHER, supra note 67, at 103 ("Olmsted's
most important objective was to use the park to restore to the alienated city inhabitants a sense of
community and to the fragmented psyche a sense of wholeness. In Olmsted's view, the park was an
aesthetic instrument to achieve a social and psychological change in a business oriented, urban
society.").
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simplicity of pastoral landscape would, he hoped, inspire commu-
nal feelings among all urban classes, muting resentments over dis-
parities of wealth and fashion. For an untrusting, watchful crowd
of urban strangers, the park would restore that "communicative-
ness" which Olmsted prized as a central American need.73
In short, both aspects of this reform were tied to the park's character as a
pastoral pleasure ground. Only interactions in this idyllic setting would
foster the sentiments of equality and community sought by these nine-
teenth-century republican reformers.
As a consequence, park advocates took strong stands about what
should be permitted in these parks. As we have seen, ornaments like
statuary were routinely opposed-though often unsuccessfully.74 Archi-
tecture was secondary to the pastoral landscape;75 buildings were kept
rustic and unobtrusive.76 Although social and political pressure from the
working class eventually won out, park advocates and administrators
staunchly resisted vigorous athletics as incompatible with the contempla-
tive and restorative aims of the park.77 Commercial activities were
anathema; they "smacked of the city to which the pleasure ground was
an antidote."' 78 Similarly, most cities prohibited political and religious
meetings in the parks because they were too divisive: "the pleasure
ground was meant to transcend, not reflect, the evils of urban life, of
which division was a prominent symptom. '79
73. Blodgett, supra note 69, at 878. Olmsted's influence, both in his own time and in ours,
should not be underestimated. "Olmsted himself designed sixteen or seventeen major park systems
in different parts of the United States; and the other designers of the era were aligned with him or
under his influence." G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 168. Blodgett reports a telling complaint by a
modern specialist: "We have not shown the ability to design anything much larger than a tot lot
which reflects the differences between our way of life and that of Olmsted." Blodgett, supra note 69,
at 888 (comments made at a 1965 White House conference on beautification).
74. See G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 55-56 (discussing the emergence of statuary in parks de-
spite designers' preferences for naturalistic shrubbery and landscaping); D. SCHUYLER, supra note
27, at 186-87 (reporting that park advocates opposed the Soldiers and Sailors Monument in the
Grand Army Plaza at the entrance to Prospect Park in Brooklyn).
75. See G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 42.
76. See id. at 49-55.
77. See id. at 15 ("In the concept of the park as pleasure ground no sport, no matter how
wholesome, could appropriately be treated as the purpose of a park, but people misunderstood the
function of parks."). Olmsted himself was a chief opponent:
Olmsted never satisfactorily reconciled his tranquil, unitary vision of Central Park with the
desires of its users. He had special trouble coping with the demands of the active young
working-class male.... Like most thoughtful contemporaries of his class, he underesti-
mated the bent for vigorous, organized leisure-time activities among boys and working
men, and responded grudgingly to their desire for "manly and blood-tingling recreations,"
"boisterous fun and rough sports."
Blodgett, supra note 69, at 881; see also discussion infra note 79.
78. G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 13.
79. Id. at 23. When Olmsted worked on Boston's Franklin Park in the 1880s, he assimilated
into his plan some of the lessons he had learned from the popular conflict over the uses of Central
Park. To avoid conflict over activities that he considered inappropriate to the pastoral pleasures of
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Thus, many of the activities that we now associate with parks were,
in the nineteenth century, deemed inherently inconsistent with the funda-
mental purposes of a park. Consider, then, how this nineteenth-century
conception of a park changes our understanding of the Boston ordinance
and the outcome in Davis. If the Boston ordinance is understood in its
historical context, Holmes and Roberts are correct in their characteriza-
tion: the ordinance is an appropriate regulation of the park. It is no
different, in principle, than a constitutionally permissible regulation that
prohibits noisy demonstrations in front of a school when classes are in
session.80 So too, Davis would be correctly decided even under the most
protective version of the modem public forum doctrine. Under that doc-
trine, the relevant question is "whether the manner of expression is basi-
cally incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time."81 Because any political or religious speech was funda-
mentally inconsistent with the "normal" activity of the park (if viewed in
its time and context), Reverend Davis's conviction under the Boston or-
dinance would be upheld: "The First Amendment does not forbid a
viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic
the naturalistic park, he placed alongside the main park a smaller ante-park designed separately to
accommodate more active recreation. See M. KALFUS, supra note 66, at 299-300; D. SCHUYLER,
supra note 27, at 141. Despite these accommodations, Olmsted remained adamantly opposed to
inconsistent uses of his parks:
Franklin Park was not expected, however, to bear the whole burden of modem activism.
Olmsted wanted no men's athletic teams playing there; he wanted labor agitators and other
speechmakers barred from its grounds; he wanted schoolchildren trained in dutiful respect
to its peaceful influences; and he repeatedly urged that flat land outside the park be set
aside for military musters, fireworks, and balloon ascensions. He specified that other facili-
ties for physical activity be located at scattered sites elsewhere in the city.
Blodgett, supra note 69, at 886. Although we can only speculate about the relationship, Reverend
Davis's complaint that the 1862 ordinance had not been applied to prohibit speech on Boston Com-
mon until 1885 may have something to do with the fact that Olmsted began to work with the city at
just that time. See id. at 883. It may also have had something to do with the change of municipal
administrations; 1885 marked the election of the first Irish-American, a Democrat, as Mayor of
Boston. Id. at 884.
80. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972) (stating that an anti-noise stat-
ute "represents a considered and specific legislative judgment that some kinds of expressive activity
should be restricted at a particular time and place, here in order to protect the schools").
81. Id. at 116. In recent years, the public forum doctrine has been applied in a manner that has
led some commentators to suggest that the nature of the forum is no longer the primary-or even a
significant--concern. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 989-93 (2d ed.
1988). Rather, the Court has increasingly collapsed the doctrine permitting reasonable "time, place,
or manner" restrictions into the more lenient standard established in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), which allows content-neutral regulation that furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to speech even though it results in incidental restriction of speech.
See Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 650-54
(1991) ("The Court's growing focus on content discrimination and its gradually narrowing definition
of discrimination in terms of government purpose may have caused the Court to conflate the various
types of 'content-neutral' regulations and to devalue the threat that such regulations pose to freedom
of speech.").
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forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose."8 2
On this basis, Roberts's distinction between Davis and Hague begins
to look more and more plausible. The Davis Court was faced with an
across-the-board regulation of the park that, inter alia, included a prohi-
bition of public speaking. In contrast, the Hague Court was faced with
an ordinance that not only applied everywhere in Jersey City,8 3 but also
was "directed solely at the exercise of the right of speech and assem-
bly."'84 Moreover, as was well known, the Jersey City ordinance was be-
ing invoked by Mayor Hague in a viewpoint-specific effort to thwart
organized labor.85
Of course, these differences are not all that support Roberts's dis-
tinction in Hague. Equally important are the intervening changes in the
uses of the park and the accompanying changes in its social conception
that increasingly undermined the constitutional logic of Holmes's opin-
ion in Davis. As we have seen, the "pleasure ground" concept of the park
was already under pressure by the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury.86 "In response to a changing constituency, park administrators
made provision for various forms of modem recreation.... [T]he rise of
active recreation marked a major shift away from the mid-century park
ideal."' 87 Playgrounds began to appear in parks with some frequency
during the late nineteenth century.88 At the turn of the century, progres-
sives reshaped park planning to reflect their view of the needs of the
82. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985). To put the
matter somewhat anachronistically, the dominant nineteenth-century conception of the park was as
a special use forum. Cf Kalven, supra note 49, at 12 ("Certainly it is easy to think of public places,
swimming pools, for example, so clearly dedicated to recreational use that talk of their use as a
public forum would in general be totally unpersuasive."). As such, speech could be regulated as long
as the regulation was "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983).
83. The ordinance applied to speech or assembly "in or upon the public streets, highways,
public parks or public buildings of Jersey City." Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
502 n.1 (1939) (plurality opinion) (quoting the local ordinance).
84. Id. at 515 (plurality opinion).
85. See id. at 505 (plurality opinion) ("The findings are that petitioners, as officials, have
adopted and enforced a deliberate policy of forbidding the respondents and their associates from
communicating their views respecting the National Labor Relations Act .... ); Kairys, supra note
38, at 240 (noting that Hague "made it clear that labor organizers were not welcome in Jersey City
.... Local businesses were promised that they would have no labor troubles while he was mayor; his
response to the CIO was: 'I am the law' ").
86. See supra notes 26-27, 74-79 and accompanying text.
87. D. SCHULYER, supra note 27, at 186 (discussing Brooklyn's Prospect Park in the late
1880s).
88. See G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 63 ("Before 1900, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pitts-
burgh, Baltimore, New Haven, Providence, and San Francisco had such playground facilities,
although these municipalities had not yet passed legislation enabling them to purchase land specifi-
cally for this purpose.").
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urban working class.8 9 Organized programming became a staple of the
park;90 consequently, "[s]ocial workers were the first professionals regu-
larly employed by parks departments."91 By the 1920s, America's urban
parks were likely to include physical facilities and organized programs
for baseball, tennis, ice hockey, and swimming, as well as official pro-
gramming as diverse as gardening, folk dancing, social dancing, medical
and dental clinics, branch libraries, and public lectures on political and
social topics. 92
During the Depression, park officials justified these programs as a
solution to the problem of "the new leisure" 93-a crude euphemism for
rampant unemployment and enforced idleness. This rationale provided
park officials with a good bargaining position in times of limited munici-
pal budgets while maintaining the park's traditional political function as
an "urban safety valve."' 94 Even so, this reformulation of the park's pur-
pose helped consolidate the social transformation of the park from a spe-
cial use facility to a more open public resource. "In replacing an
ideology of reform with one of leisure, park departments... made them-
selves subject to demand rather than to a norm of public service .... -g9
At the time of Roberts's opinion in Hague, the narrow conception of the
park that underlay the Boston ordinance would have seemed increasingly
unpersuasive. Conversely, the idea that the urban park was an appropri-
ate literal analogue to the metaphoric "marketplace of ideas" 96 would
have seemed increasingly plausible.
This is not to suggest that, by the 1930s, the park had spontaneously
developed into a first-amendment forum. To the contrary, sedimented
attitudes and assumptions were continually manifested throughout these
changes in park theory and practice. Park officials continued to resist
89. See id. at 61-62. Cranz refers to this as the Reform Era, which he dates from 1900 to 1930.
See id. at 61-80. For a discussion of the changing attitudes toward recreation and leisure that oc-
curred as a response to the industrialization of the late nineteenth century, see D. RODGaS, THE
WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 94-124 (1978).
In Cranz's account of urban parks in America, the Reform Era was succeeded by the Recrea-
tion Era, which he dates from 1930 to 1965, and the Open Space System, which he dates from 1965
and thereafter. See G. CRANz, supra note 26, at 101-17, 135-42. Cranz's somewhat formalistic
periodization has been criticized. See, e.g., M. KALFUS, supra note 66, at 299, 394 n.6; D. SCHUY-
LER, supra note 27, at 229. I have therefore used Cranz with some caution, drawing on his extensive
reports of data and trends without necessarily relying on his specific periodization.
90. See G. CRANz, supra note 26, at 61-62.
91. Id. at 169.
92. See id. at 68-77.
93. Id. at 105.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 106-07.
96. For a discussion of the conventional metaphors and social experiences that motivate this
Holmesian metaphor, see Winter, supra note 16, at 1188-90.
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unsponsored political, religious, and commercial activities.97 At the
same time, both the programs they championed and the justifications
they offered tended to support the wide-ranging use of park facilities for
purposes of expression.
[P]ark departments... encouraged activities which lent themselves
to festivals and pageantry-music, dramatics, dancing, art exhib-
its-because of their power to stimulate community interaction
and integration. But it was characteristic of the era that these ac-
tivities were also advocated by parks spokespeople who viewed
them primarily as means of self-expression. The absence of a clar-
ion call to reform during the era allowed a carefree variety of
claims and appeals to surface. 98
Notwithstanding the historical revisionism, by 1939 it was no longer far-
fetched for Roberts to suggest that parks were used "for purposes of as-
sembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." 99
Thus, Roberts's rewrite of history and his revision of legal doctrine
were not made out of whole cloth. Rather, they reflected major, wide-
spread social changes in the practices and background assumptions that
shaped the contemporary conception of the park and its proper uses. As
aptly put in a Chicago park commission report just a year after Hague:
"The shift was not in things or properties; it was in the social meanings
of those things and properties."100 Roberts's interrogation of Davis could
not help but be affected by these intervening changes in social meaning;
the question whether first-amendment activities constituted an appropri-
ate public use of the park could only be answered in light of the prevail-
ing social conception of the park. As Kairys suggests, it is in just this
way that judges are "quite accustomed to... implementing changes of
society's rules expressed in legal terms and not necessarily even self-un-
derstood as changes."' 01
97.
Reform parks usually retained no more than fragments inherited from pleasure ground
policy, namely, their prejudices. San Francisco park reports throughout the reform era
show denials of permission for political assemblies, gospel meetings, peddling, advertising,
and gambling, and commercial amusements such as theatres, motion picture houses, sa-
loons, and bowling alleys were systematically excluded.
G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 78; cf id. at 142 (describing the resistance of park administrators to
protests during the Vietnam War era).
98. Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
99. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
100. G. CRANZ, supra note 26, at 122 (quoting CHICAGO SOUTH PARK COMM'N, REPORT 1940,
at 228).
101. Kairys, supra note 38, at 259; cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE CAsE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA
74-75, 83 (P. Gewirtz ed., M. Ansaldi trans. 1989) ("All words (that is, linguistic symbols) and all
rules composed of words continuously change meaning as new conditions emerge."), discussed in
Winter, supra note 3, at 1515-16.
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C. The Persistence of the Pleasure Ground
Social conceptions that are deeply sedimented, however, will con-
tinue to be invoked by courts without self-conscious awareness either of
their political origins or of their normative dimensions. Two recent ex-
amples of this phenomenon of adversity are Clark v. Community for Cre-
ative Non- Violence 102 and Naturist Society, Inc. v. Fillyaw.103
In Clark, the Court upheld the application of the Interior Depart-
ment's anti-camping regulation to prohibit demonstrators, who were pro-
testing the plight of the homeless, from sleeping overnight in a tent city
set up across from the White House in Lafayette Park. The Court as-
sumed that the proposed sleeping was "expressive conduct protected to
some extent by the First Amendment."' 1 4 At the same time, the Court
was categorical about the applicability of the regulation: "It cannot seri-
ously be doubted that sleeping in tents for the purpose of expressing the
plight of the homeless falls within the regulation's definition of camp-
ing." 10 5 Accordingly, it upheld the regulation as a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction designed to keep "the parks at the heart of
our Capital in an attractive and intact condition." 10 6 "[U]sing these ar-
eas as living accommodations," the Court observed, "would be totally
inimical to these purposes."10 7
In dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that "neither the Govern-
ment nor the majority adequately explains how prohibiting respondents'
planned activity will substantially further that interest."' 08 True, the
Court was evidently concerned with the wear and tear on the park, hence
its reference to keeping the park "intact." But that hardly explains the
Court's conclusion; the same line of reasoning would justify prohibiting
any large scale demonstration, just as the governmental interest in
preventing litter would justify a ban on distributing leaflets.' 0 9 More-
over, concern with wear and tear is not quite the same as the Court's
102. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
103. 736 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 934 F.2d 1177 (1lth Cir. 1991).
104. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
105. Id. at 292-93 n.4; see also id. at 300 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I find it difficult to con-
ceive of what 'camping' means, if it does not include pitching a tent and building a fire.... With all
its frailties, the English language, as used in this country for several centuries, and as used in the
Park Service regulations, could hardly be plainer ... .
106. Id. at 296.
107. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 300 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[Clamping in the park
.. is conduct that interferes with the rights of others to use Lafayette Park for the purpose for
which it was created.").
108. Id. at 308 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding that a ban on handbilling was
unconstitutional).
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assertion that the projected activity-sleeping-was "totally inimical" to
the purposes of the park.
What underlay the Court's claim, of course, was a residual sedimen-
tation: the nineteenth-century conception of the park as pleasure
ground. This conception is implicit in the Court's insistence that the
anti-camping regulation would keep the park "attractive,"' 110 and it is
apparent in the Court's initial description of the affected parks:
[T]he National Memorial-core parks, Lafayette Park and the Mall,
... are unique resources that the Federal Government holds in
trust for the American people. Lafayette Park is a roughly 7-acre
square located across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House.
Although originally part of the White House grounds, President
Jefferson set it aside as a park for the use of residents and visitors.
It is a "garden park with a ... formal landscaping of flowers and
trees, with fountains, walks, and benches.".. . The Mall ... in-
cludes the Washington Monument, a series of reflecting pools,
trees, lawns, and other greenery.... Both the Park and the Mall
were included in Major Pierre L'Enfant's original plan for the Cap-
ital. Both are visited by vast numbers of visitors from around the
country .... II1I
Chief Justice Burger expressed the point with characteristic simplicity:
"Respondents' attempt at camping... is conduct that interferes with the
rights of others to use Lafayette Park for the purposes for which it was
created."112 Although Hague and its progeny opened the urban park to
expressive activity, the Court nevertheless managed unconsciously to
reassert the original narrow conception of the park as pleasure ground in
its determination of what forms that expression could permissibly take.
In Naturist Society, the federal district court considered a challenge
to Florida park regulations that, inter alia, prohibited the "[s]ale or dis-
tribution of printed matter without a permit" and absolutely forbade any
person to "use ... or enter any park for the purpose of announcing,
displaying advertising, or calling attention to any person, political party,
religious institution or sect, or meeting or assembly thereof, or for the
110. Clark, 468 U.S. at 296.
111. Id. at 290 (quoting the NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WHITE
HOUSE AND PRESIDENT'S PARK, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.3 (1981)). The Court's obser-
vation that the park is a resource "that the Federal Government holds in trust for the American
people" is an echo of Roberts's recitation in Hague of the traditional view that "streets and parks...
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public." Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
In contrast, Justice Marshall characterized the majority's description of these parks as "pecu-
liar." Clark, 468 U.S. at 302 (Marshall, J., dissenting). While he acknowledged that it was "inter-
esting" to learn about the historical origin of these parks, he pointed out that: "Missing from the
majority's description is any inkling that Lafayette Park and the Mall have served as the sites for
some of the most rousing political demonstrations in the Nation's history." Id. at 303.
112. Id. at 300 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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purpose of advertising any item or service for sale." 113 The plaintiffs,
members of a society that promotes "social nudism," sought access to the
John D. MacArthur State Park in order to display signs, distribute litera-
ture, and circulate petitions advocating that the north end of the park's
beach be designated "clothing-optional." ' 1 4 The district court upheld
the state's decision to limit the plaintiffs' "demonstration" to a card table
in the parking lot, without banners or signs, at a fixed location that was
out of the flow of pedestrian traffic.115
In considering the constitutionality of the state regulation, the dis-
trict court focused on the state's property rights in a manner more remi-
niscent of Davis than Hague.1 6 It reasoned that a beach is a nonpublic
forum and not "a traditional public forum such as the townsquare."11 7
Accordingly, the state "can act to preserve the property for its intended
use."
1 1 8
Given, however, that the beach is a state park, it is instructive to see
how hard the court struggled to distinguish Hague.
To state the obvious, John D. MacArthur park is a beach. Persons
visit such a place for its recreational features. Visitors can swim
and play games or merely rest under the sunshine, enjoying the
natural beauty of the scenary [sic] .... The primary purpose of a
public beach is to provide a place for public relaxation and recrea-
tion, whether active or restful. Unlike a public street or city park,
beach visitors do not reasonably expect to be subjected to the full
exercise of others' rights of free speech while at a public beach....
Further, unlike a park or street, the beach visitor cannot easily
walk away. Some persons may feel more vulnerable when they lie
on a beach without their normal amount of clothing. They often
lie on the beach on a blanket or sit in a chair, arranging their pos-
sessions around themselves and setting out various objects such as
drinks, a radio, and lotion. To require the beach visitor to leave
every time a speaker approached or persisted in his solicitation
113. Naturist Society, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 736 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. 16D-2.07(1)(h) & 16D-2.08(2)(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985)), aff'd, 934 F.2d 1177
(I lth Cir. 1991). The plaintiffs also challenged Rule 16D-2.04(l)(e), which requires bathers to wear
swimsuits that "conform to commonly accepted standards." Id. at 1108 (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 1106. The court found that, before the beach was acquired by the state, the north end
had been used by naturists for nude bathing. Id.
115. Id. at 1116-18.
116. The district court characterized the state's interests as "substantial and important."
The state owns the John D. MacArthur beach with the right to manage it and use it to
assure the site's availability for its primary purposes; in this case, as a beach .... The state
... has an important interest in protecting its own property. Indeed, a very significant
portion of Florida's economy is sustained by tourist visits attracted in large part by the
state's natural resources including its beaches.
Id. at 1114 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 296, and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)).
117. Id. at 1115.
118. Id.
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would impose a significant burden on the use of the park.1 19
Certainly, everything the court noted about the beach is true of a park:
people go to parks for recreation, for the beauty of the scenery, for relax-
ation (or, as the court tellingly put it, "for public relaxation"), and even
to sunbathe (at least that was true the last time I visited Central Park in
summer).
Of course, it is not rigorous logic that sustains the court's conclu-
sion. What sustains it (if anything does) is a culturally specific picture of
an afternoon spent relaxing at the beach, one's "space" carefully demar-
cated with blankets and personal accouterment. 20 As the park adminis-
trator candidly stated in a letter to the Naturist Society: "We cannot...
tolerate the actions of a few persons or groups to upset or destroy the
harmony that our visitors have come to enjoy in Florida State Parks."'121
That sentiment would have resonated with the drafters of the 1862 ordi-
nance at issue in Davis or, for that matter, with Frederick Law Olmsted.
III. Conflict on Cultural Grounds
A. Two Worlds, Worlds Apart
The Six Rivers National Forest in northwest California contains
sites sacred to the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa communities-Native
Americans of the Klamath River region. It is also part of a national
system of wilderness lands administered by the United States Forest Ser-
vice.122 In the 1970s, the Forest Service decided to open the virgin tim-
ber of the Blue Creek Unit of this national forest to logging. The
resulting land management plan provided for the completion of the last
segment of the road from Gasquet to Orleans, California ("the G-0
Road"). Lying in the Chimney Rock section of the Blue Creek Unit, this
segment of approximately six miles runs through the "high country" sa-
cred to the Native American communities of the Klamath River area.
The Forest Service plan was criticized by the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation. In response to the Council's inquiry whether the
area could instead be added to the National Register of Historic Places,
the Forest Service commissioned Dr. Dorothea Theodoratus to conduct
a cultural and anthropological study of the sites and their importance to
119. Id. at 1116-17.
120. Cf Kalven, supra note 49, at 12 ("Certainly it is easy to think of public places, swimming
pools, for example, so clearly dedicated to recreational use that talk of their use as a public forum
would in general be totally unpersuasive.").
121. Naturist Society, 736 F. Supp. at 1112. The plaintiffs had relied on this letter in support of
their claim that the defendant's actions were motivated by opposition to their message. The court
rejected that claim. Id. at 1113.
122. See 16 U.S.C. § 1609 (1988).
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the local Native American communities. In her report, Dr. Theodoratus
recommended that the area be placed on the National Register. 123 The
report also concluded:
It is the general assessment... that the completion of the G-O
Road via any of the proposed Chimney Rock alternatives (Routes
1-9) will produce an irreparable impact on the spiritual and physi-
cal well-being of the adjacent Yurok, Karok and Tolowa commu-
nities. Such impact will be created through the degradation of
salient environmental qualities pertinent to the power quests of me-
dicinal and spiritual practitioners who serve these communities.124
While the Forest Service took steps to initiate the first recommendation,
it nevertheless went ahead with its plans to develop the area and com-
plete the G-0 Road.
The Native Americans sued to prevent the adoption of the land
management plan and to enjoin completion of the road. Although the
suit presented several statutory claims, the primary ground for relief was
the claim that the Forest Service plan violated their rights under the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. 125 The district court enjoined
the Forest Service both from opening the area to logging and from com-
pleting the G-O Road. The court found that the proposed road would
impose a significant burden on the free exercise of the Native Americans'
religion that was not justified by a countervailing governmental
interest. 126
While an appeal was pending, Congress designated most of the Blue
Creek section as a Wilderness Area,127 mooting the development plans.
But Congress did not include in this designation the 1200-foot-wide cor-
ridor encompassing the G-0 Road. 128 After rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
123. See Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet-Orleans
Road, Six Rivers National Forest (1979), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 110, 197, Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013) [hereinafter Theodoratus
Report].
124. Id. The Report explained: "Specific sites within the project area are necessary to the train-
ing and ongoing religious experience of individuals using the area for personal medicine and growth,
curing medicine, deviltry, and medicine affecting the well being of local communities as well as
(today) the broader world community." Id. at 181.
125. The additional claims were premised on environmental statutes. The Native American
plaintiffs were joined by several environmental groups and the state of California. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 590-91 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
126. The district court found that the road "would not materially serve several of the claimed
governmental interests." Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595. It found the other asserted interests "specu-
lative and diffuse" or otherwise falling "far short" of a compelling state interest. Id.
127. California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, § 101, 98 Stat. 1619 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988)).
128. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir.
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affirmed the district court's injunction barring completion of the road. 129
The government sought certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and reversed in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association. 130
The Court concluded that the proposed completion of the G-0
Road did not implicate free exercise concerns despite its "severe adverse
effects on the practice of their religion." 131 It reasoned that the govern-
ment's action would neither "coerce" anyone into violating their reli-
gious beliefs nor penalize religious activity by denying a generally
available benefit.' 32 Rather, the Court read the free exercise clause nar-
rowly as a strict command of government neutrality. "The crucial word
in the constitutional text is 'prohibit': 'For the Free Exercise Clause is
written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not
in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.' '133 The
Court reasoned that the effect of the injunction was to grant the Native
Americans a "religious servitude"'134 over national lands:
No disrespect for these [religious] practices is implied when one
notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial own-
ership of some rather spacious tracts of public property. Even
without anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Govern-
ment's property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian
religion, would in this case be far from trivial .... 135
The characterization of governmental actions in terms of "coer-
cion," "neutrality," and "subsidy" raises the question of the background
assumptions against which those actions are measured. This case is,
therefore, a logical occasion for the critique that challenges the conven-
tional assumptions upon which a legal characterization depends. The
background regime of legal entitlements will determine what benefits are
perceived as out-of-the-ordinary and, therefore, a subsidy and what im-
positions are understood as unwarranted and, thus, a coercive penalty or
burden.136 Accordingly, some commentators have suggested that the
Court found no "coercion" in Lyng because it measured the govern-
1986), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988).
129. Id. at 691-93, 698.
130. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
131. Id. at 447.
132. Id. at 450-51 (rejecting a free exercise challenge to "incidental effects of government pro-
grams, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs").
133. Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)).
134. Id. at 452.
135. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
136. See Hale, supra note 3, at 476-77 (noting that the concept of "coercion" is entirely depen-
dent upon prior definition of legal and moral duties); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 882-83 ("The deci-
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ment's actions against a common-law "baseline."' 137 If one starts with
the routine common-law assumptions about property ownership, then
the government's actions in this case cannot be viewed as coercive be-
cause the government was only asserting "its right to use what is, after
all, its land."'138 Conversely, to confer on the Native American commu-
nities special rights that effectively preclude other uses would constitute
a subsidy. 139
The problem with this analysis, however, is that the common law
could equally provide the baseline for exactly the opposite set of charac-
terizations and conclusions. Ira Lupu has argued that the common-law
baseline "would support a finding of burden" in Lyng because the Native
Americans' historic use of the high country could logically be said to
establish an easement by prescription.' 40 In fact, the Native Americans
made the closely analogous claim under Hague and the modem public
forum doctrine.
The sacred area in this case has been used continuously "from time
immemorial" by the region's Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians
for religious use; indeed, the practices which are seriously
threatened by the government's actions have existed at this site
long before the Six Rivers National Forest was established or the
government even obtained title to the land.141
Measured against this baseline, the district court's injunction was hardly
a subsidy. 142 To the contrary, the decision to complete the G-0 Road
looks more like an unwarranted burden analogous to a nuisance or con-
structive eviction.1 43
The manifest indeterminacy of the common law makes it unsuitable
sion about what is partisanship and what is neutrality depends on the baseline used for
measurement.").
137. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 47, at 277 (Supp.
1989) (concluding that the Court in Lyng was "relying largely on common-law or pre-governmental
conceptions of what 'coercion' is").
138. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
139. Thus, in its brief in the Supreme Court in Lyng, the government argued that:
The public lands are a finite resource .... Moreover, the potential uses for a particular
piece of property are frequently incompatible. The determination that one use is appropri-
ate for a site may rule out several other competing uses for both that site and the surround-
ing area. And these potential uses are not simply abstractions .... Land management
decisions thus resemble a zero sum game in which the government must choose among
various individuals' competing claims to use particular public land.
Brief for Petitioners at 37, Lyng (No. 86-1013) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
140. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102
HARV. L. REv. 933, 972-76 (1989).
141. Brief for Indian Respondents at 40, Lyng (No. 86-1013).
142. Cf Brief for Respondent State of California at 15, Lyng (No. 86-1013) ("Forebearing to
destroy the salient qualities of the high country does not provide the Indians with something they
did not have before.").
143. See Lupu, supra note 140, at 975-76 (suggesting the latter analogy).
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as a baseline because it cannot accomplish what a baseline must: afford a
set of assumptions sufficiently firm and automatic to provide a stable,
intelligible ground for subsequent cognitive operations. Rather, the com-
mon-law rules of property are themselves only midrange conceptions
that depend on more deeply sedimented, cultural assumptions. To un-
derstand the Court's decision in Lyng, we need to understand the back-
ground conceptions that led the Court to see only one of these two
common-law characterizations as appropriate.
One way to approach the problem would be to consider the set of
assumptions that frame only one of two competing claims as a property
claim. For the Court, the case was a conflict between "the diminution of
the Government's property rights," on one hand, and "the concomitant
subsidy of the Indian religion" on the other.14 It is easy enough to iden-
tify the legal conceptions that framed the case this way. The Forest Ser-
vice operates under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960145 and
the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
1974,146 passed pursuant to the property clause. 147 The former statute
requires the development and maintenance of "the national forests for
multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and services ob-
tained therefrom."1 48 The Native Americans, on the other hand, in-
voked the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom. 149 This
was obviously necessary. Had they proceeded on a property theory, they
would have had to confront the implications of their conquest and colo-
nization. 150 They would have run headlong into the property clause.
So far, the analysis is rather unremarkable. Except for one thing.
To understand the case as one concerning a conflict between "land use"
and "religion" is already to load the normative dice. These characteristi-
cally Western categories organize the world in a way that is radically
different from Native American understandings; indeed, these Western
categories simultaneously distort and disadvantage the Native Ameri-
144. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
145. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988).
146. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988).
147. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1988). "Multiple use" is defined as "the most judicious use of the land for
some or all of these resources or related services." Id. § 531(a). "Sustained yield of the several
products and services" is defined as the "achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level
annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without
impairment of the productivity of the land." Id. § 53 1(b).
149. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
150. See generally R. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 8 (1990) ("The immunizing function of law and legal discourse also
served as an effective tool for dismissing or deflating demands for further justifications or examina-
tions of the colonizing enterprise.").
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cans' claims.151 Where Western culture separates the physical from the
spiritual, Native American culture views Nature as that which mediates
between the human and the divine.152 Thus, Western culture distin-
guishes objects and their utility as resources from subjective mental states
(like religious beliefs) and their significance to personal fulfillment. Na-
tive American culture, on the other hand, perceives an "intimate connec-
tion between environment, ecology, and religion."15 3
When the native American looks at nature, it isn't with the idea of
training a glass upon it, or pushing it away so that he can focus
upon it from a distance. In his mind, nature is not something apart
from him. He conceives of it, rather, as an element in which he
exists. 154
As described by contemporary Native Americans: "I use sacred land
every day to exist on."' 55 "In seeking the religious reality behind the
American Indian tribal existence, Americans are in fact attempting to
come to grips with the land that produced the Indian tribal cultures and
151.
Because of the particular nature of the Indian perceptual experience, as opposed to the
particular nature of the predominant non-Indian, Western perceptual experience, any divi-
sion into "religious" or "sacred" is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into
non-Indian categories, and distorts the original conceptualization in the process.
Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 110.
152. See A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WORSHIP IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 126-27 (1981);
see also Defendants' Exhibit F, Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 198, Lyng (No.
86-1013) [hereinafter Defendants' Exhibit F].
The conflict over the "High Country"... goes beyond the question of whether or not the
religious rights of a minority group are being denied. It involves a cultural conflict over
the meaning of the area, with one culture's perception that it is a holy land challenged by
another culture's belief that it is merely a valuable source of timber, copper, and other
economically necessary resources. By denying that it is a fragile, significant area with
religious values, the non-Indian culture is actually stating that the Indian's religion is of no
value.
Defendants' Exhibit F, supra, at 200.
153. A. HULTKRANTz, supra note 152, at 121. Hultkrantz cites to Ann Gayton's work with a
central California tribe of the San Joaquin Valley. See Gayton, Culture-Environment Integration:
External References in Yokuts Life, 2 Sw. J. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 252, 253 (1946) ("[Tbhere is an
intimate relation between important immaterial phases of the culture and the environmental
setting.").
154. Momaday, Native American Attitudes to the Environment, in SEEING WITH A NATIVE EYE:
ESSAYS ON NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION 79, 84 (W. Capps ed. 1976). In Western thought, the
closest analogue to this way of understanding the relationship between self and world is the phenom-
enological tradition in continental philosophy. See, eg., M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY
OF PERCEPTION xi (C. Smith trans. 1962) ("The world is not an object such that I have in my
possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my
explicit perceptions.... [T]here is no inner man, man is the world, and only in the world does he
know himself."). For an elaboration of how this way of thinking might inform our understanding of
constitutional law, see Winter, supra note 3, at 1447-53, 1485-94, 1507-13.
155. A. HULTKRANTZ, supra note 152, at 128. Or as one member of the communities affected in
this case put it: "People who make ... decisions must walk the land, know the people, and learn
what is important to them." Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 149 (quoting a Native
consultant).
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their vision of community."15 6
Consider how these conceptual differences affect the reasoning in
Lyng. For the Native American communities, the questions of "land
use" and "religion" are but one question; for them, the questions of how
one lives on the land and how one practices "religion" are one and the
same. For the Court, however, the Native Americans' claim with respect
to the land was something separate and outside. The Court did not see a
holistic form of life rooted in an intimate association with the local geog-
raphy; it saw, instead, a claim of access for religious purposes no differ-
ent than that of a church group wanting to hold services on government
property. For the Court, the land-based religious practices of the Native
American communities became just another "use" value that must com-
pete with other, more compelling use values. 157
Once the claim is conceived in this way, however, the Native Ameri-
cans' attempt to preserve the pristine conditions of a resource that is the
government's to manage seems an obvious case of overreaching. That is
exactly how the government argued the case:
The free exercise claim advanced by respondents does not merely
seek access to government property, it intrudes far more deeply
into the management of public lands. Permanently barring the
government from maintaining and developing its own property to
achieve what it has determined to be its best uses of that property
is far more onerous-and far more preclusive of other individuals'
competing claims to use of the particular land-than requiring the
government to allow an individual access to its property while
leaving undisturbed the government's physical management of per-
missible uses. 158
By introducing a conceptual separation between the Native American
communities and the land, the centuries-old practices of these communi-
ties becomes a deep "intrusion" into the "permissible" uses of the gov-
ernment's property. In just this way, the Court is blinded from seeing
the Native Americans' claim as a competing claim to the land.
Unthinking reliance on a Western conception of religion also dis-
torts and reduces the Native American claimants' interest to a mere mat-
ter of subjective preference. In Native American culture, religion may be
said to encompass the entire form of life. 159 In Western culture, on the
156. V. DELORIA, GOD IS RED 88 (1973).
157. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("[A]
law forbidding the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a different
set of constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, how-
ever, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.").
158. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 139, at 40.
159. See Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 180-81 ("This belief system has been shown to
incorporate elements of daily life, ritual practice, geographic locale, and ideas of origin and World
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other hand, religion is primarily a matter of belief or creed. "The free
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."' 16 Thus, the govern-
ment argued that "the complainant's objection relates to his perception
of how the government action may adversely affect his spiritual life." 161
It emphasized that, if the Constitution did mandate deference to such
"perceptions," the inherently subjective forces of religious need and de-
sire would prove ungovernable. "Further, the decision to attach religious
significance to a particular parcel of land owned by the government is
wholly unrelated to the land use selected by the government; it flows
solely from the individual religious belief." 162 Accordingly, it warned the
Court of the parade of horrors that would inevitably ensue. Others could
claim that their religion required the government to make or refrain from
making social welfare expenditures, or that the eagle is too sacred to be
profaned by use as the national symbol, or that foreign aid to a particular
government was either necessary for or an affront to their religious prac-
tices and beliefs. 163 "[I]t is this very subjectivity in the definition of reli-
gion that calls out for an objective limit on the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause."164
In short, the Western categories that form the background concep-
tions in this case depend upon an understanding of objectivity and sub-
jectivity as antagonistic, mutually exclusive alternatives. Moreover, this
dichotomy and its associated dichotomous categories impose a particu-
lar, normative conception of subject-object relations that is savagely in-
strumentalist. Religion is a matter of belief; it is subjective, a matter of
private preferences. Land, on the other hand, is something to be used; it
is a resource to be maximized. The two belong to essentially separate
spheres that entail different kinds of endeavor. One lies in the realm of
conscience and belief, the other in the domain of action.165 The govern-
Renewal into a conceptualization of sacredness. This concept is foreign in many ways to western
European categories of thought."). For a comparison and contrast of these different conceptions of
"religion" and the implications for free exercise doctrine, see Williams & Williams, Volitionalism
and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 769 (1991)
160. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990). In Smith, two Native Americans
were fired from their jobs as drug counselors because of their sacramental use of peyote. The use of
peyote was a crime under state law. The Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits in
these circumstances did not constitute a burden on the free exercise of the Native religion. Id. at
1599-1602.
161. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 139, at 27-28 n.24.
162. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
163. See id. at 29. The Court directly incorporated this argument in its opinion. See Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
164. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 139, at 30.
165. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602 (1990) ("Respondents urge us to
hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convic-
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ment cannot interfere in the private sphere of religious belief and opin-
ion. Thus, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he Constitution does not
permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular
physical sites as sacred." 166 By the same token, however, religion cannot
interfere with the public sphere of land use and resource maximization.
"[G]overnment simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy
every citizen's religious needs and desires." 167
Because the Court viewed the case in this sectorized way, it was able
to conclude both that the Forest Service plan could have "devastating
effects on the traditional Indian religious practices" 168 and that it would,
nevertheless, "have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting con-
trary to their religious beliefs." 169 Of course, the inadequacy of this rigid
sectorization occurred even to the Court; it realized that governmental
programs will produce "incidental effects" which "make it more difficult
to practice certain religions." 170 And it acknowledged that the imperfec-
tion of these categories is cause for regret. 171 But it nevertheless insisted
that the "neutrality" and integrity of this line drawing must, in principle,
be maintained. 172 Otherwise, the potentially ungovernable forces of sub-
jective belief and desire would be overwhelming. 173
B. Language and Landscape
Not surprisingly, the issues look quite different when they are un-
derstood against the alternative background of Native American culture.
For Native Americans, it is the land that makes meaning possible:
tions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We
have never held that, and decline to do so now."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)
("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
166. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
167. Id. at 452. At this point in its opinion, the Court recalled the parade of horrors that the
government had conjured up in its brief. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
168. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
169. Id. at 450.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 452 ("However much we might wish that it were otherwise. . . ."); id. at 453
("Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious
needs of any citizen.").
172. See id. at 451 ("Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on
the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the location
of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development.").
173. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1605 (1990) (rejecting the argument that
government must show a compelling state interest supporting a regulation that prohibits religiously
commanded conduct because "[a]ny society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy"); id.
at 1606 (acknowledging the potential oppression of minority religions, but concluding that the "una-
voidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself").
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"American Indians hold their lands-places-as having the highest pos-
sible meaning, and all their statements are made with this reference point
in mind." 174 Indeed, for many Native Americans, the land is a vital,
constitutive element of their moral life: "The land is always stalking peo-
ple. The land makes people live right. The land looks after us."' 175 Once
this way of seeing the land is understood, the "incidental" effects of a
development plan can look more like the government's affirmative sup-
pression of a remarkably complex normative system. The goal of this
section is to show how the government's action in a land case such as this
can be a paradigmatic first-amendment violation: when the government
"develops" the resources of "what is, after all, its land,"' 176 those actions
may constitute nothing less than censorship.
For the Native American, land, religion, culture, and community
are part of a single, integrated network of symbolic meaning: "features
of the environment which are not essential to basic subsistence are
caught up into the ceremonial, social, and religious superstructure."' 77
As enlightened modems, we may tend to think of these systems as primi-
tive, mystical, arcane. Indeed, this impression seems confirmed by evi-
dence of occult practices such as medicine making, power quests, and
visions. But once we understand it, the integration of geography, cul-
ture, and self that characterizes the Native world view appears enviable
in its subtlety, elegance, and sophistication.
Although both the environmental features that are selected and the
meanings that are attached vary, what is common to many Native com-
munities is the way in which the physical environment provides the sym-
bolic system of their cultural life.
[T]he native American ethic with respect to the physical world is a
matter of reciprocal appropriation: appropriations in which man
invests himself in the landscape, and at the same time incorporates
the landscape into his own most fundamental experience....
... [T]his appropriation is primarily a matter of the imagina-
tion. The appropriation is realized through an act of the imagina-
tion which is moral [in] kind. I mean to say that we are all, I
suppose, at the most fundamental level what we imagine ourselves
to be. And this is certainly true of the American Indian.... [I-]e
is someone who thinks of himself in a particular way and his idea
comprehends his relationship to the physical world, among other
things. He imagines himself in terms of that relationship and
174. V. DELORIA, supra note 156, at 75.
175. K. BASSO, WESTERN APACHE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 100 (1989) (quoting Mrs. Annie
Peaches).
176. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
177. Gayton, supra note 153, at 264.
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others. And it is that act of the imagination, that moral act of the
imagination, that I think constitutes his understanding of the phys-
ical world.1 78
For example, the landscape and its fauna can be the source for "stan-
dardized mental symbols and imagery" that are then incorporated in vi-
sions or ceremonies; interpretation of these symbols may constitute "as
normal a mental activity as, say, reading in our own culture." 179 More-
over, the symbolic use of imagery taken from the local landscape has a
distinct advantage over the abstract symbolic forms typical of Western
culture: "External reminders of cultural forms [are] met at any turn in
the trail, on every hand, day in and day out."180
Using these social and symbolic processes, Native American com-
munities draw upon the land as "the source of spiritual origins and sus-
taining myth which in turn provides a landscape of cultural and
emotional meaning."181 Here, the operative mechanism is narrative.
Many of the legends and myths of Native communities are localized in
the nearby landscape.182 In Lyng, for example, Dr. Theodoratus re-
ported that the high country "is the setting for many myths and narra-
tives which are an integral part of traditional Northwest Indian beliefs
and world view." 18 3 Although she did not fully develop their signifi-
cance, 18 4 we can get some sense of the vital importance of these geo-
178. Momaday, supra note 154, at 80.
179. See Gayton, supra note 153, at 266 (discussing the Yokuts use of animal imagery in dreams
for the purpose of obtaining supernatural powers).
180. Id. at 265; see also Smothers, Future In Mind, Choctaws Reject Plan for Landfill, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 21, 1991, § 1, at 22, col. 2 ("For Odie Jim, 63 years old, the concern was... what could
happen to the land that his ancestors had doggedly held on to while most Choctaws were being
driven to reservations in Oklahoma in the last century. Mr. Jim credited the tribe's ability to hold on
to its language and much of its culture through the years to the members' succeeding in maintaining
their connection to the land.").
181. Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D.L. REV. 246, 250
(1989). As we have seen, there are analogous Western cultural processes. Olmsted, it will be recal-
led, viewed the naturalistic urban park as having uplifting psychic effects on its users. See supra
notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Similarly, the statuary so opposed by nineteenth-century park
advocates can be understood as visual encodings of civic lessons. See supra notes 27, 74 and accom-
panying text.
182. See, e.g., F. BoAs, GEOGRAPHIC NAMES OF THE KwAKiurL INDIANS 9, 22-35 (1934)
(describing how myths of the Kwakiutl Indians are attached to specific places).
183. Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 146; see also Recommendations of the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation on the Gasquet-Orleans Road Six Rivers National Forest, re-
printed in Joint Appendix at 203, 213, Lyng (No. 86-1013) ("In cataloging the aspects of the High
Country which, cummulatively [sic], accounted for its particular significance to indigenous popula-
tions, the mythical importance of the area most certainly be [sic] included. Many myths or other
narratives either took place in this setting or used esoteric practice there as a central motif." (cita-
tions omitted)).
184. At several points in her report, Dr. Theodoratus remarked on the guarded and confidential
nature of her Native informants:
[P]art of the belief system.., requires that Indians avoid indiscriminate discussions about
this sacred training. As has been pointed out by a Karok man, "Indian people are very
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graphically grounded narratives from an historical note she does provide:
"[W]hen the federal government attempted to remove Indian people
from the Klamath River to reservations distant from their homeland,
they almost invariably escaped and made their way back to the Klamath
River where the geography provided daily associations with their tradi-
tional religious practices." 185
The cultural role of geographically grounded narratives is not re-
stricted to myths and religious practices. For some Native communities,
the local geography is also the source and symbol of narratives that in-
corporate important cultural norms. The Western Apache, for example,
have a tradition of historical narrative which consists of stories that en-
code moral lessons of appropriate communal behavior. When a member
of the tribe violates a tribal norm, the pertinent story will be told to re-
mind that person how to behave. Typically, the narrator is an elder who
may tell the story to a larger group without specifying the intended "tar-
get." As described by one Apache:
So someone stalks you and tells a story about what happened
long ago. It doesn't matter if other people are around-you're go-
ing to know he's aiming that story at you. All of a sudden it hits
you! It's like an arrow, they say .... [I]t goes in deep and starts
working on your mind right away. No one says anything to you,
only the story is all, but now you know that people have been
watching you and talking about you. They don't like how you've
been acting. So you have to think about your life. 186
Each story is named after and situated in the local landscape. Every
recitation of the story begins and ends with the invocation of the place
name, such as "It happened at 'coarse-textured rocks lie above in a com-
pact cluster'" or "It happened at 'men stand above here and there.' "187
Once the intended target has internalized the point of the story, the local
geography continues to act as a metonym for the moral lesson.
It's hard to keep on living right. Many things jump up at you
and block your way. But you won't forget that story. You're go-
ing to see the place where it happened, maybe every day .... If
confidential. There are lots of things that white society still doesn't know, and Indian
people won't give out any information about it whatsoever."
Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 145. This secrecy was particularly evident with respect to
culturally significant aspects of the local landscape. Id. at 160 ("Many consultants chose to be
deliberately vague about specific locations of sacred places because it is culturally inappropriate to
discuss such sacred sites."); see also id. at 147 ("Other ethnographers have noted secrecy in studies of
Indian religions ....").
185. Id. at 185; see also Pommersheim, supra note 181, at 251 (noting the similar failure of a
government relocation program in the 1950s that attempted to move Native Americans off the reser-
vations and resettle them in major urban areas).
186. K. BAsso, supra note 175, at 124-25.
187. Id. at 119.
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you don't see it, you're going to hear its name and see it in your
mind. It doesn't matter if you get old-that place will keep on
stalking you like the one who shot you with the story.1 88
Part of the effectiveness of the practice is a matter of association.
Many Native American place names are richly descriptive of the physical
features of the landscape; others refer to some historical practice or event
identified with the place. 189 Typically, the specificity of the place name
provides a connection between the narrative and the unique features of
the local landscape. In many instances, the description of the location
bears a figurative relation to the substance of the story. For example, the
story entitled "It happened at 'coarse-textured rocks lie above in a com-
pact cluster'" concerns the death and disgrace of an Apache who sexu-
ally molested his stepdaughter in violation of Apache incest taboo. 190
The imagery of the place name is a rather graphic metaphor for sex
("coarse-textured rocks lie above") within the family ("in a compact
cluster").
In other instances the relation is less colorful, although no less force-
ful. "It happened at 'men stand above here and there'" concerns the
humiliation of an Apache who acted too much like a white. The story
takes place during a period of famine on the reservation. An Apache
killed a white man's cow someplace off the reservation. He was arrested
by a policeman, another Apache, at "men stand above here and there."
But, when the Native policeman went to report the arrest to the com-
mander at Fort Apache, he forgot what he had come to report. He re-
turned to make his report the next day, but again forgot why he had
come. After an attempt to cover his embarrassment by making small
talk with his supervisor, he took the man who had killed the cow and
188. Id. at 125. Basso reports that related cultural practices contribute to the success of this
socialization device. "Apaches, who travel a great deal to and from their homes, habitually call on
each other to describe their trips in detail." Id. at 107.
189. See, eg., id. at 110-11. According to Basso, descriptive names are by far the most common
amongst the Apache. Id. References to legendary and mythological events are also frequent among
southwestern tribes, but they are rare amongst those of the Pacific Northwest. F. BOAS, supra note
182, at 21.
190. K. BAsso, supra note 175, at 119. A similar example is the story "It happened at 'big
cottonwood trees stand spreading here and there.'" This story concerns a mother-in-law ("big cot-
tonwood tree") who meddles in her son-in-law's household ("spreading here and there"). During
the first year of marriage, Apache couples live in the camp of the bride's parents. (Thus, "big cot-
tonwood trees" represent the shelter of the parents' camp.) While there, custom entitles the bride's
mother to criticize and instruct her son-in-law. Once the new couple establishes their own residence,
however, social custom prohibits the mother-in-law from interfering. In "It happened at 'big cotton-
wood trees stand spreading here and there,'" a rival tribe attacked the Apache camp before dawn
and killed the residents in their sleep. An old woman heard some Apache men cry out and, thinking
it was her son-in-law picking on her daughter, she called out to him to stop. The attacking tribe
heard her and killed her. Only a single young girl survived the attack. Id. at 118.
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relased him at "men stand above here and there." 191 The story is under-
stood as "a harsh indictment of persons who join with outsiders against
members of their own community."' 192
The association that gives this story so much power is one that can-
not be replicated. The spot called "men stand above here and there" is a
ridge overlooking the valley in which this Apache community lives. In
the mid-nineteenth century, lookouts were posted at that spot to protect
against surprise attacks from the U.S. Sixth Cavalry. 193
It is by no means certain that all Native American communities ob-
serve precisely these cultural practices with respect to place names and
moral narratives. 194 Nevertheless, the record in Lyng indicates that the
Klamath River communities also maintain a close connection between
particular locations and important cultural narratives. In describing the
religious practices of these Native communities, Dr. Theodoratus noted
that: "An indispensible participant in the World Renewal ceremonies is
an individual (a formulist or medicine man ... ) who recites set narra-
tives at specified places in a fixed order." 195 Even more evocative is the
report of one of her correspondents concerning the quest through the
high country for spiritual power. "Every step of the way is important:
'every step of the way you learn something.' "196
The symbolic importance of the landscape to Native Americans,
and its role in maintaining their nomos, dramatically changes the nature
of the issues in a case like Lyng. Any alteration of the landscape-the
placement of a road, the mining of a ridge, the harvesting of a forest-
could be the destruction of an irreplaceable landmark significant to the
191. Id. at 119-20.
192. Id. at 120.
193. Id. at 111. Basso describes an instance in which this story was used with great effect. A
young woman appeared at a puberty ceremony wearing pink plastic curlers in her hair. According
to Apache custom, those attending are supposed to wear their hair in a free-flowing manner as a sign
of respect. When this young woman subsequently visited her grandmother, the older woman re-
counted "It happened at 'men stand above here and there.'" Shortly thereafter, the young woman
left. When Basso inquired about her departure, the grandmother said: "I shot her with an arrow."
Two years later, Basso gave the young woman a ride home. He asked her about the incident.
In English, she explained that as soon as she realized that her grandmother was referring to her: "I
sure don't like how she is talking about me, so... I threw those curlers away." Basso pointed out
that they were passing "men stand above here and there." "She said nothing for several moments.
Then she smiled and spoke softly in her own language: 'I know that place. It stalks me every day.'"
Id. at 121-23.
194. See A. HULTKRANTZ, supra note 152, at 118-19 ("There is, in fact, much to say against any
generalization of Indian relations with nature in North America. The continent is large and com-
plex, geographically as well as ethnographically."). Basso notes, however, that there has been com-
paratively little study of Native American place names. See K. BAsso, supra note 175, at 105-06.
195. Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 112-13; see also supra text accompanying notes 183-
85.
196. Theodoratus Report, supra note 123, at 133-34.
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moral life of the Native American community. Thus, "[t]he Govern-
ment's rights to the use of its own land" 197 may, in a literal sense not
even anticipated by Robert Cover, entail the authority to destroy the
"6common life in a dedicated space within the normative world." 198 In
point of fact, the Court's indulgence of the "incidental" effects of the
Forest Service's land development plan may be the realistic equivalent of
allowing the government to expunge a chapter of the Bible.
IV. Root Difficulties
Alexander Bickel struck a deeply resonant chord when he branded
judicial review "a deviant institution in the American democracy." 199
"For judges and lawyers, the 'countermajoritarian difficulty' recalled the
Old Court's long, and ultimately futile, judicial struggle against the New
Deal. For them, Bickel's warning reinforced the impropriety of using the
Constitution as laissez-faire capitalism's ultimate weapon against popular
control." 200 The modern preoccupation with the countermajoritarian
difficulty is driven by the anxiety that the Warren Court's protection of
minority rights and individual liberties, which many of us view as a genu-
ine "good thing," may be indistinguishable in theory from the predations
of the Lochner Court.
Indeed, once generalized and stated at the level of political theory,
the conflict between democracy and judicial review seems difficult to
avoid.201
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian
force in our system.... [W]hen the Supreme Court declares un-
constitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive,
it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here
and now; it exercises control not in behalf of the prevailing major-
ity, but against it.2O2
197. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454 (1988).
198. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 49 (1983).
199. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITics 18 (2d ed. 1986).
200. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014-15
(1984); see also Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitu-
tion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 63-64 (1989) (noting the pivotal role of Lochner and the reaction it
engendered during the New Deal period in shaping modem constitutional law); Winter, supra note
3, at 1460-65, 1469-71 (arguing that the post-New Deal paradigm in constitutional law was shaped
by the reaction to Lochner, but that the modem preoccupation with the "countermajoritarian diffi-
culty" is a reaction to the anomaly opened up by Brown).
201. "[N]o amount of tampering with democratic theory can conceal the fact that a system in
which the policy preferences of minorities prevail over majorities is at odds with the traditional
criteria for... democracy .... " Dahl, supra note 31, at 283.
202. A. BICKEL, supra note 199, at 16-17.
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Nevertheless, the examples we have explored above suggest that the spec-
ter of judicial review as an anti-majoritarian force is primarily a problem
of the legal foreground. To a large extent, much of what the Court does
necessarily employs mainstream conceptions that already preclude or im-
pair minority concerns-in effect, exercising control not against the pre-
vailing majority, but on its behalf.
Much of the force of Bickel's formulation is a function of the au-
thority of its background conceptions. The conventional statement of the
countermajoritarian difficulty is firmly grounded in two closely related
assumptions: first, that the electoral process is definitive of democracy
and, second, that an unelected judiciary is politically unaccountable. 20 3
This grounding is implicit in Bickel's "root difficulty" metaphor, and it is
explicit in his ensuing discussion.20 4 Yet, "[e]ven superficial analysis
reveals.., that the contrast between a Court wholly insulated from the
desires of the electorate and a legislature and executive devotedly regis-
tering the will of their constituents functions rather as a literary device
than as a description of reality. '20 5 On one hand, President Reagan's
success in reconstituting the federal bench seems to confirm the wisdom
of Robert Dahl's observation that "the policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant
among the lawmaking majority of the United States. ' 20 6 On the other
203. In contrast, Dahl's original analysis of this problem starts from the more subtle premise
that democracy consists in policymaking which reflects majority preferences-of which electoral
outcomes are only a rough gauge. See Dahi, supra note 31, at 283-84.
204. Bickel acknowledges that:
there are other means than the electoral process, though subordinate and subsidiary ones,
of making institutions of government responsive to the needs and wishes of the governed.
Hence one may infer that judicial review, although not responsible, may have ways of being
responsive. But nothing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in dem-
ocratic theory and practice to the electoral process.
A. BICKEL, supra note 199, at 19.
205. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law
and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 185 (1968).
206. Dahl, supra note 31, at 285; see R. DAHL, DEMoCRACY AND ITS CRrrIcs 190 (1989)
("[Tihe views of a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long
with the views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country."). In response, someone
will no doubt point out that presidents often make "mistakes" in making judicial appointments-
mistakes that these presidents later come to regret. See eg., J. ELY, supra note 30, at 46-47 (noting
that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower are reported to have considered the appointments of Jus-
tices Clark and Warren, respectively, as their "worst mistakes"). The problem with this observation
is that a couple of exceptions do not necessarily disprove the rule. Aside from Clark and Warren,
who are all these other "mistaken" appointments? (Blackmun, maybe.) In contrast, the dramatic
impact of the Roosevelt and Reagan appointments on the Court's orientation more closely typifies
the less conspicuous changes effected by other presidents. Within two years of Nixon's resignation,
for example, the Court decided: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the death pen-
alty); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of intent to discriminate to estab-
lish an equal protection violation); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (rendering impossible all
systemic challenges to police violence); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (excluding fourth-
amendment claims from habeas corpus review); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that
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hand, it is increasingly difficult in these days of entrenched congressional
incumbency, falling rates of electoral participation, slick media cam-
paigns, and "Read my lips" sloganeering to mistake the electoral process
for the authentic workings of a democracy. 20 7
Of course, the democratic objection to judicial review has never re-
ally depended on a candid assessment of the actual practices of democ-
racy.208 To the contrary, Thayer's early statement of the case against
judicial review was premised on a set of explicitly idealized assumptions
about the processes of representative democracy:
[I]n a court's revision of legislative acts, . . . the question is not
merely what persons may rationally do who are such as we often
see, in point of fact, in our legislative bodies, persons untaught it
may be, indocile, thoughtless, reckless, incompetent-but what
those other persons, competent, well-instructed, sagacious, atten-
tive, intent only on public ends, fit to represent a self-governing
people, such as our theory of government assumes to be carrying
on our public affairs,-what such persons may reasonably think or
do, what is the permissible view for them.0 9
But this idealization only reinforces the sense in which the
countermajoritarian difficulty is not the logical and theoretical trump
that it sometimes appears, but is itself a controversial normative claim
about appropriate institutional relations among different governmental
defamation by police officials implicates no liberty or property interest secured by the due process
clause); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity
from damage actions alleging unconstitutional conduct); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(invoking cost-benefit analysis in approving post-deprivation hearings for disability benefits termina-
tions); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring a showing of"scienter" to estab-
lish securities fraud under Rule 10(b)(5)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (raising the
constitutional minima for standing); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (disapproving interdis-
trict relief for school desegregation); and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (limiting plaintiffs
to "prospective" injunctive relief under the Eleventh Amendment). Of these opinions, all but two
were written by Nixon appointees. See also Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1122-24
(1991) (describing the significant inroads in the Warren Court's jurisprudence made by the Burger-
Rehnquist Courts).
207. Cf. Dahli, supra note 31, at 283-84 ("[Nlational elections are little more than an indication
of the first preferences of a number of citizens-in the United States the number ranges between
about forty and sixty percent of the adult population-for certain candidates for public office....
[O]n the basis of an election it is almost never possible to adduce whether a majority does or does not
support one of two or more policy alternatives.").
208. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 367 (1978) ("We
may assume that the preferences of voters are ultimately emotional, inarticulate, and not subject to
rational defense.... [Tjhe will of the majority controls, not because it is right, but-well, because it
is the will of the majority. This is surely an impoverished conception of democracy, but it expresses
at least one ingredient of any philosophy of democracy .... ").
209. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 149 (1893). To be sure, Thayer's more important theoretical point concerns the perverse
incentive structure of a system in which those chiefly responsible for policymaking are encouraged to
defer questions about the normative appropriateness of their decisions to other decision makers. Id.
at 155-56. It is precisely this point that Robert Dahl has emphasized in his most recent reconsidera-
tion of the value of judicial review. See R. DAHL, supra note 206, at 189, 192.
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agencies. 210
This tendentious quality is revealed in a curious feature of contem-
porary discussions of the countermajoritarian difficulty. What begins as
a problem concerning the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy
invariably and inexplicably turns into a debate about judicial method.211
Routinely, discussions of the countermajoritarian difficulty undergo a
stunningly swift metamorphosis from a question of institutional legiti-
macy (what justifies judicial review?), to one of institutional relations
(how should the Court coordinate with the "political" branches?), 212 to
one of institutional competence (what is it that courts do better than leg-
islatures?),213 to one about institutional role performance (has the Court
210. Cf. Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1207, 1210 (1984) ("[I]n selecting a model for
judicial review.... the choice must be based upon substantive values, upon a political theory that
examines how our government should be structured and identifies which values are so important
that they must be shielded from majority rule.").
211. In Gerald Gunther's casebook, for example, this shift appears rather abruptly at page 20.
See G. GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 20 (noting that questions of constitutional interpretation and the
proper degree of deference to legislative judgments are "[closely related to the debate over the legiti-
macy ofjudicial review"); cf. Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal
Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 971-72 (1988) (tracing the infinite regress in constitutional
theorizing).
212. Thus, the doctrinal point of Thayer's article is that a court should not hold a statute uncon-
stitutional unless its invalidity is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. See Thayer, supra note 209, at
138-52. Similarly, one can readily understand the various positions of Ackerman, Bickel, and Ely as
first and foremost a matter of institutional relations in a properly conceived democratic system. For
Ackerman, the Court acts as an intertemporal mediator between the vicissitudes of normal, interest-
driven politics and the more authoritative, democratic contributions of politically mobilized consti-
tutional moments. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 463
(1989); Ackerman, supra note 200, at 1049-51. For Bickel, the "passive virtues" act as a mediating
device or safety valve as the Court tries to introduce principle into the ongoing politics of legislative
enactments. See A. BICKEL, supra note 199, at 111-98. And, for Ely, the role of judicial review is
essentially facilitative of ordinary, democratic politics. See J. ELY, supra note 30, at 73-104.
213. This is immediately apparent in Bickel, who justifies judicial review in terms of the differen-
tial capacity of judges to engage with matters of principle:
[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and
executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is
crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society, and it is not something that institu-
tions can do well occasionally, while operating for the most part with a different set of
gears....
Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal
to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in
the moment's hue and cry.
A. BICKEL, supra note 199, at 25-26. On this point, Bickel's position is hardly different from that of
Jesse Choper, Owen Fiss, or Herbert Weehsler. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 138, 168 (1980) ("The Court's formidable and delicate task is to con-
sult those complex sources of historic and contemporary values that are the ingredients of sound
constitutional interpretation, as well as its wisdom and conscience-and then to decide."); Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1979)
(noting that the judicial office "is structured by both ideological and institutional factors that enable
and perhaps even force the judge to be objective .... Two aspects of the judicial office give it this
special cast: one is the judge's obligation to participate in a dialogue, and the second is his indepen-
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acted in a properly constrained manner?). 214 Yet, no matter how one
answers these questions-and no matter which conventional justification
of or limitation on judicial review one finds congenial-the central prob-
lematic remains: an unelected judiciary is empowered to overrule the pol-
icy decisions of the "representatives of the actual people of the here and
now. '2 15 Imagine a parallel conversation among economists. Someone
identifies that the regulation of some area of the economy is inconsistent
with what we know about the functioning of markets. Everyone nods
sagaciously and responds (in chorus): "Yes, yes. Definitely. What we
should do is regulate it in [my favorite] way ... ." In much the same
way, Bickel identifies a problem at the root of the practice and every-
one-himself included-immediately begins to talk about how the
branches should yield their fruit.
If the transposition of the issue is in one sense startling, it is in an-
other sense utterly predictable. Much too much rides on the practice of
judicial review, and almost no one in the legal academy (and I do not
exempt myself) is ready to give it up.216 Liberals want more activist
protection of minorities and civil liberties; conservatives want more pro-
tection of private property; and everyone wants a judicial audience to
whom they can address their professional prescriptions.2 17 "[I]t is no
wonder that a great deal of effort has gone into the enterprise of proving
that, even if the Court consistently defends minorities against majorities,
dence."); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15-16
(1959) ("[Tlhe main constituent of the judicial process is that it must be genuinely principled, resting
with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite tran-
scending the immediate result that is acheived ...." "No legislator or executive is obligated by the
nature of its function to support its choice of values by the type of reasoned explanation that... is
intrinsic to judicial action .... ). And, in an important sense, each of these writers finds resonance
in the earlier comments of John Stuart Mill. See J. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 242-43 (C. Shields ed. 1958) (3d ed. 1865) ("[C]onplete reliance has been felt, not
only on the intellectual pre-eminence of the judges composing that exalted tribunal, but on their
entire superiority over either private or sectional partialities."). Even Ely echoes this theme in justi-
fying his conception of a representation-reenforcing approach to judicial review. J. ELY, supra note
30, at 88 ("[S]uch an approach ...involves tasks that courts, as experts on process and (more
important) as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better qualified and situated to perform
than political officials.").
214. Thus, the chief debate centers not on whether we should have judicial review, but rather
over the appropriate methodologies for the Court to use: Should the Court be interpretivist or non-
interpretivist? Originalist or organicist? Etc., etc. See, eg., Chemerinsky, supra note 210, at 1207-
09 (describing the debate between interpretivists and non-interpretivists).
215. A. BICKEL, supra note 199, at 17.
216. "[J]udicial review greatly increases the power of certain lawyers, and indirectly of the legal
profession, over the shaping of the American constitutional and political system and its public poli-
cies. Thus the power ofjudicial review nicely serves the corporate interests of the legal profession."
R. DAHL, supra note 206, at 358 n.5.
217. But see Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) (gently ques-
tioning the convention that authorizes the academy to make normative prescriptions without check-
ing to see whether anyone is listening).
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nonetheless it is a thoroughly 'democratic' institution. ' 21 8
And, yet, it is not my point that the character of the debate is deter-
mined solely or even primarily by professional self-interest. Rather,
something else lurks unexamined in the background of these discussions
of the countermajoritarian difficulty that frames and shapes the terms of
the debate. That something else is the practice of judicial review itself.
Imagine the article that concluded: "Marbury is wrong as a matter of
legal and political theory. Judicial review is undemocratic. It should
stop." It is unthinkable. No one-not Thayer, nor Frankfurter, nor
Bickel, nor Bork-even comes remotely close to such a conclusion.219 It
is unthinkable because, for us, judicial review is itself an institution so
firmly established in our political, social, and professional consciousness
that its continued existence is utterly unassailable: "Inertia is a guiding
principle in politics as well as physics, and the very existence of our insti-
tutions-the persuasive testimony of history-itself serves to produce a
significant degree of acceptance. ' 220 As a consequence, the only ques-
tions that are conceivable for us concern the forms judicial review might
take and the limits it should observe.
In other words, discussions of the countermajoritarian difficulty and
the debates over the proper parameters for judicial review are foreground
disputes that are actively shaped by the range of background assump-
tions against which they necessarily take place. The modem debate over
judicial review transpires against the immediate background of the Loch-
ner era and its repudiation in favor of the New Deal. But the debate also
takes place against a deeper, more entrenched historical background out
of which the practice of judicial review emerged as a quintessentially
American contribution to jurisprudential and political thought.221 The
218. Dahl, supra note 31, at 283.
219. See Chemerinsky, supra note 210, at 1209 ("None of the critics of the Supreme Court's
activism suggests that all judicial review should be eliminated.... [E]ven judicial review based on
the intent of the Framers is, by the critics' criteria, undemocratic.").
220. Deutsch, supra note 205, at 216; see also A. BICKEL, supra note 199, at 14 ("So long have
[Marbury v. Madison and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee] been among the realities of our national exist-
ence .... It is late for radical changes."); L. TRIBE, supra note 81, § 1-9, at 15 (stating that his
treatise proceeds "on the premise of a relatively large judicial role more because it has become an
historical given than because any ineluctable logic would have made an alternative course of history
unthinkable or patently unwise."). At the same time, the historical contingency of the practice does
not in any way impeach its propriety.
In the absence of a universally best solution [to the problem of minority rights], specific
solutions need to be adapted to the historical conditions and experiences, political culture,
and concrete political institutions of a particular country. Quasi guardianship in the form
of a supreme court with the power of judicial review is a solution that Americans have
accepted as desirable.
R. DAHL, supra note 206, at 192.
221. S. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRU-
DENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 6 (1990) ("[T]hree problematics of central concern in American
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paradox which makes this issue so intractable is that the background
assumption-i.e., the cultural and cognitive entrenchment of the histori-
cal practice of judicial review-is also the subject of the foreground
dispute.
V. Living with the Upside/Down
The countermajoritarian difficulty begins to pale once we recognize
the courts' dependence on the cultural understandings that enable mean-
ing. The conventional concern is that judges will impose their values in
contravention of the policy choices of democratically elected legislatures.
But the mutual entailment of the epistemic and the political means that
judges cannot even think without implicating the dominant normative
assumptions that shape their society and reproduce their political and
cultural context. We have seen how the unreflective invocation of basic
social conceptions-like the concept of a park, the nature of religion, and
the idea of land as a resource-can already mold doctrinal outcomes in
ways that disfavor and disadvantage minority claims. Under these cir-
cumstances, judicial review is not quite the champion of the oppressed-
nor the threat to democratic values-that we sometimes suppose.
Have we solved the countermajoritarian difficulty? Hardly, and for
two reasons. First, the normatively loaded conceptions that frame and
configure legal thinking in terms of the dominant understandings of the
culture are not the equivalent of mechanical formulae capable of deter-
mining a single "right answer." Because those conceptions must be of
the sort that enable action and thought under dynamic social conditions,
they necessarily entail only normative orientations and not determinate
procedures capable of imposing specific outcomes.222 Second, dominant
revolutionary considerations of law-legal certainty, judicial independence, and judicial space-
prompted juries to take the final judgment of law away from justices in colonial America. And these
same three problematics can be seen to feature in the post-revolutionary decision by framers of the
Constitution to move this power of final judgment into the forum of a newly conceived court, in the
form of judicial review."); see also 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 73-142 (1971) (discussing historical anteced-
ents ofjudicial review in colonial and state court practices); Thayer, supra note 209, at 130-34 (ocat-
ing the origins of judicial review in the constitutive legal power of colonial charters and describing
some of the state struggles over judicial power in the first quarter of the nineteenth century).
Early nineteenth-century courts justified judicial review as a majoritarian constraint on elected
representatives. Nelson, supra note 29, at 1170-72. Concern over the anti-democratic quality of
judicial review became acute during the Jacksonian age. Id. at 1180. But the practice of judicial
review was already entrenched by that time; rather than abandon an established practice, the courts
articulated a rationale that justified the practice as necessary to protect minorities against the tyr-
anny of the majority. Id. at 1181-84.
222. For a more complete explanation, see Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 992-97 (1991); see also Winter, supra note 3, at 1490-94 (explain-
ing the role of sedimentation in enabling some and disabling other developments in constitutional
law).
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conceptions are not the same thing as majority decisions. Indeed, they can
be antithetical to the particular results of majority deliberations-as
Lochner itself attests. For both these reasons, there is no necessary
agreement between legislative determinations and judicial decision mak-
ing. To be sure, both legislative and judicial decisions spring from the
same social and cultural sources. And, as a consequence, they are likely
to converge--or, at least, run parallel-in most cases. But it remains
perfectly possible to have the worst of both worlds: judicial review (or
interpretation) that overturns (or undermines) democratic decision mak-
ing, but that nevertheless fails to transcend the dominant normative as-
sumptions implicit in our background conceptions.
These observations suggest, however, that the conventional focus on
the countermajoritarian difficulty misses the more significant difficulties
of both democracy and constitutionalism. Because most of our attention
is on the institutional conflicts that occupy the foreground, we tend not
to notice the more powerful normative processes at work in the back-
ground. While we worry about overt judicial fidelity to majoritarian de-
cision making, we fail to examine the constitutive role of our sedimented
cultural conceptions in both the judicial and legislative processes. Be-
cause legislators too can act only in terms of the cultural understandings
that enable meaning, an important part of any statute "is not made by
the legislator, but grows and develops as an implication of complex prac-
tices and attitudes which may themselves be in a state of develop-
ment. ' 223 By the same token, when, as in Hague, judges engage in
"innovative" interpretations of constitutional rights, they may only be
realizing those same developments in social practices and attitudes as
they affect our reflexive understanding of basic social conceptions. 224
This means, however, that neither the legislative nor the judicial
processes fit neatly into the foreground categories to which they are ordi-
narily assigned. The identification of democratic self-government with
decision making by majority vote is problematic. On one hand, both the
electoral and legislative processes will already be shaped by the dominant
normative assumptions immanent in sedimented social conceptions-as-
sumptions that, in any given case, can ensure self-defeat rather than en-
able self-direction. On the other hand, the outcomes of deliberative
processes will not necessarily bear their intended meanings, but will
evolve along with changes in the underlying social practices. Similarly,
223. L. FULLER, supra note 23, at 59.
224. See Winter, supra note 3, at 1505-22 (discussing and elaborating "trimorphic constitutional-
ism," which includes a cultural, socially-situated mode of constitutional lawmaking that originates
outside the formal processes of legislation, adjudication, and constitutional emendation).
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the assumption that the Court can be relied on to enforce constitutional
constraints neglects the significance of the unarticulated normative as-
sumptions that shape and produce legal outcomes with distinctively
majoritarian overtones.
It is only something like a conceptual gestalt switch that can bring
the importance of the background adequately into focus. An upside/
down view of the countermajoritarian difficulty is necessary before we
can even begin meaningfully to think about the field.
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